Information

Fairey Albacores in the Middle East (2 of 3)


Fairey Albacores in the Middle East (2 of 3)


A flight of Fairey Albacores somewhere in the Middle East.


Iran Hostage Crisis

On November 4, 1979, a group of Iranian students stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, taking more than 60 American hostages. The immediate cause of this action was President Jimmy Carter’s decision to allow Iran’s deposed Shah, a pro-Western autocrat who had been expelled from his country some months before, to come to the United States for cancer treatment. However, the hostage-taking was about more than the Shah’s medical care: it was a dramatic way for the student revolutionaries to declare a break with Iran’s past and an end to American interference in its affairs. It was also a way to raise the intra- and international profile of the revolution’s leader, the anti-American cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The students set their hostages free on January 21, 1981, 444 days after the crisis began and just hours after President Ronald Reagan delivered his inaugural address. Many historians believe that hostage crisis cost Jimmy Carter a second term as president.


AHC: Peerless Air Ministry

When Sir Hugh and Sir Philip sat down to discuss the naval operation MB8, Sir Hugh ventured that the Naval plan seemed very complicated if not overly so. Would adding the resupply of Hurricanes to Malta the final straw? A conference was quickly organised at the Admiralty to finalise the RAF part of the plan. At the start of the briefing Admiral Sir Arthur Dowding explained the objectives of all the interlinked operations and how they formed a diversion or smoke screen for the main objective, of an attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto.

The plan had originated during the Abyssinian crisis of the mid nineteen thirties and had been regularly updated. The aircraft carrier Glorious and her air group of Fairey Swordfish had trained and practised for the attack in 1939. Since the entry of Italy into the war in Late June the RN had been preparing to carry out the plan. With the Italians sending regular supply convoys to Italian North Africa the Italian fleet based in Taranto had been reinforced and was acting as a ‘fleet in being’ and thus tying down valuable RN resources that were needed elseware. With Operation Compass being planned to start in December the time to strike would be in the correct moon phase in mid November. As part of the deception plan the Navy were keen to do a major aircraft re supply run to Malta. Three aircraft carriers seen filling their decks with land planes in Gibraltar, by the Germans Spanish friends meant they were highly unlikely to be part of an attack on the Italian fleet!

Aircraft resupply trips into the Mediterranean had become known as ‘Club Runs’ and this was planned to be the largest yet. With Glorious, Courageous and Furious all participating in what was known as Operation White. This would deliver some eighty four Hurricanes in one go. Courageous and Glorious would carry their full complement of Folland Fighters and Fairey Albacores. Furious would retain only six of her Follond falcon fighters for self defence and they would only be usable once all the Hurricanes had flown off.

Operation MB8 would now consist of seven interlink elements, these being,

Operation White, Glorious, Courageous and Furious, delivering aircraft to Malta.

Operation Coat, reinforcement convoy to Malta. The convoy includes the battleship HMS Barham and the heavy cruisers HMS Glasgow and Berwick. They are accompanied by HMS Ark Royal.

Convoy MW 3 Three empty merchant men bound for Malta then sailed on the 4th November arriving 10th November escort including cruiser HMS Coventry

Convoy ME 3 Four Merchant ships in ballast with heavy escort, Including Battleship HMS Ramillies and HMS Coventry Sails on the 11th November from Malta arrives Alexandria 13th November

Convoy AN6 Four slow tankers to Greece escort includes Cruisers HMS Ajax and HMAS Sydney as force B delivering materials and men to Crete. HMS Orion a light cruiser carrying RAF personnel to Greece forms Force C, on the night 11/12 November force B and C will combine as force X and make an offensive foray into the Otranto Strait.

Operation Crack, Aircraft from HMS Courageous, HMS Glorious and HMS Furious Attack airfields and Facilities around Cagliari on Sardinia as they return to Gibraltar form operation White

Operation Judgement. Consisting of the carrier HMS Illustrious, with the battleships HMS Warspite, Valiant and Malay were to be joined by the battleship HMS Ramallies from convoy ME 3 and the heavy cruisers HMS Glouster and York plus three destroyers from Convoy MW 3. The final element of the operation Judgement force would be the Aircraft Carrier HMS Ark Royal joining from operation Coat.

The Three aircraft carriers taking part in operation White would leave Gibraltar after the Operation Coat Convoy and catch up with it before Cape Bone. Here it would come under the protection of aircraft from Ark Royal whilst the RAF fighters were flown off to Malta. Once their decks were clear Furious, Courageous and Glorious would provide air cover for the Operation Coat Convoy until Malta based aircraft could take over.

This would permit Ark Royal to team south and east around Malta to join operation Judgement.

Furious would cross deck some Fairey Albacores from both Courageous and Glorious so that when they had finished providing air cover to Operation Coat they could launch bigger strike more quickly to hit the airfield and other facilities at Cagilari on Sicily. To further cause the Italians confusion the Aircraft attacking Cagilari would bear squadrons codes for HMS, Ark Royal, Courageous, and Glorious.

Despite the maritime ballet required and the complication of movement each element served a purpose and made the core of the entire enterprise, the attack on Taranto possible.

That attack would be undertaken by Twenty four albacores flying from HMS Invincible and a further twenty four from Ark Royal. Twelve aircraft from each carrier would comprise the first wave. Six would carry torpedoes , two would carry flares and four bombs of 250lb each. The final four would carry one fifteen hundred pound ‘longbow bomb’. This long thin bomb that fits in place of an 18 inch torpedo and had an explosive content of fifty percent. Though not designed to be armoured piercing it has a relatively thick nose casing and has dual fusing, having both time delay and solvent fuses. In operation Judgement it was intended that with the shallow sea bed a near miss with a ‘Longbow’ would do nearly as much damage as a direct hit by stoving in the hull. Ark Royal’s torpedo aircraft would attack from the northwest of the harbour and Invincible, aircraft from the south west. The latest photographic reconnaissance picture showed all six Italian Battles ships anchored in a group in the Mar Grand close to Taranto town with three heavy cruises lying together further offshore.

Flares would be dropped on the east of the Mar Grand. The flare droppers then using their two hundred and fifty bound bombs to attack the oil storage tanks. The eight other bomb carrying aircraft were detailed to attack the heavy cruisers in the Mar Grand and Mar Piccilo First wave torpedo aircraft were instructed to attack the six battle ships in the Mar Grand as their primary target. Each pair was assigned a ship to attack identified by its location from the latest reconnaissance photographs.

The second wave scheduled to arrive half an hour later had the same composition but slightly different instructions. Their primary target s were any undamaged Battle ships, secondary targets were the heavy cruisers. The flare dropping aircraft had the same instructions as the first wave. The four aircraft from each carrier carrying ‘Longbow’ bombs were given the destroyer and light cruiser trots in the Mar Piccolo as their primary target and the docks as their secondary one.

Discussing all this with Sir Arthur , Sir Hugh and Sir Phillip asked what the navy wanted from the RAF. Sir Arthur suggested that an attack by the RAF Wellingtons dropping Aerial mines commencing just as the flare dropping air craft completed their runs could very well distract the Italians enough to improve the chances of the torpedo carrying aircraft. . There had been some discussion over whether the Aerial mine was the best ordinance for the job, whilst in its sea mine mode it could do serious damage to a battleship, the chances of one being triggered was slight and the falling mines might not really be noticed by the Italians and therefore provide little or no distraction. Sir Hugh suggested that the Wellingtons could carry two standard fifteen hundred pound Mk I-IV mines and that if half the bombers in each squadron carried a full load of mixed AP and HC bombs this would enhance the distraction and might obscure the location of the mines when dropped, this was agreed in principle with a second wave of two squadrons timed to arrive with the second wave of FAA aircraft carrying the same ordinance load.

The final decision was that the first RAF attack would use two thirds of the aircraft carrying five hundred pound bombs and the other four using Aerial Mines. The second wave would carry Aerial Mines only, with eight being tasked with mining the Mar Grand and the other four tasked with hitting the Mar Piccolo and the dock yard.
There had been some discussion as to whether the first two operational squadrons of RAF Bomber Command Stirlings could also make a worthwhile contribution. They had the range to do a shuttle attack from the UK to Egypt via Taranto and could deliver eight thousand pounds of ordinance. Whilst very tempting as an idea Sir Hugh, ventured that the Squadrons were not yet operationaly mature enough to carry out such a mission, even with the best navigation training and the use of the brand new mark fourteen bomb site the chance that they would hit anything of importance would be unlikely. Basically the potential losses were not proportional to the probable damage to the enemy.
Sir Arthur noted at this point that some FAA officers were predicting losses of around fifty percent in this attack. However he was of the opinion that two squadrons of Wellingtons flying from Malta and two squadrons flying from bases in Egypt would be a significant addition to the alarm and despondency caused the Italian Navy by this operation. The attack on Taranto had originally been planned for Trafalgar day on the twenty first of October but the entire operation had been delayed due to problems with the dropping of torpedoes in such shallow water using the Albacore aircraft. When the attack was first muted the FAA torpedo aircraft was the Swordfish, the torpedoes had been modified for dropping from the Swordfish. When the Albacore replaced it and new tests on shallow water torpedo dropping had been carried out on a live torpedo training run the majority of the torpedoes struck bottom causing a hasty redesign of the additional appendages used for shallow water drops and an enforced delay of the attack date.

Both Sir Hugh and Sir Phillip had followed the opening gambits of Operation MB8 with great interest and some trepidation. When the bulk of the Hurricanes arrived safely on Malta there were audible sighs of relieve.

On the Morning of the twelve of November Sir Hugh was relieved to get the casualty returns from the four squadrons involved in operation Judgement, Only two aircraft had been lost on the operation. One had aborted on the way to the target due to engine problems and one other been written off in a bad landing on Malta. Stone walls and Wellington bombers do not make for a good ending. All in all not as bad as Sir Hugh had thought probable. As to the FAA He had not yet heard from the Admiralty and the reconnaissance Maryland from Malta had not yet returned.

Late on the twelve Sir Hugh Dowding was informed of the triumph of the navy at Taranto. Basically the heavy units of the Italian navy had been wiped out as a fighting force for some time. Initial analysis of the reconnaissance photographs from Malta had indicated that of the six battle ships anchored in the Mar Grand at Taranto, One was capsized, one was awash and listing heavily to port. Another was heavily down by the bow and aground. Of the other three two were surrounded by large oil slicks and appeared either to be bottomed by counter flooding or riding very deep. The last one appeared to be undamaged though the photo interpretation people were waiting for prints to arrive in the UK as they were intrigued by the shadows cast by this ship in the early morning light. Off the three heavy cruisers in the outer harbour, one showed serious bomb damage aft and another one was listing to starboard, the third appeared untouched. In the Mar Piccolo damage assessment was made difficult by palls of smoke rising from the dock yard and the vicinity of the Destroyer trots. In any event it was an amazing result and no doubt Sir Hugh and Sir Phillip would hear the full story in due course. Sir Hugh had enquired of his brother how bad the losses were, with an audible smile in his voice Sir Arthur replied that only five aircraft of the forty five that actually took part in the raid had been lost and there was a good chance that some of the fifteen missing airman had survived.

The icing on the cake was that force X had intercepted an Italian convoy in the straits of Otranto and had sunk all four of the merchant ships in it and one of the escort without receiving any significant damage in response.

Later intelligence analysis would clarify just how much damage the Italian ships had suffered but on an initial perusal, the photographs led the Admiralty to the conclusion that they had total superiority in the Mediterranean for a least three to four months and that as many convoys as possible should be pushed though to both supply Malta and to transit the Mediterranean so as to hurry supplies and materials to Egypt to support operation Compass.
Analysing the effectiveness of the four Wellington Squadrons was more difficult. However in Both Malta and Egypt senior FAA officers visited the Squadrons involved with sufficient naval rum for enough tots to well and truly splice the Main Brace.

MrCharles

Operation MB8. Who’s ‘Mare Nostrum’ is it?

When Sir Hugh and Sir Philip sat down to discuss the naval operation MB8, Sir Hugh ventured that the Naval plan seemed very complicated if not overly so. Would adding the resupply of Hurricanes to Malta the final straw? A conference was quickly organised at the Admiralty to finalise the RAF part of the plan. At the start of the briefing Admiral Sir Arthur Dowding explained the objectives of all the interlinked operations and how they formed a diversion or smoke screen for the main objective, of an attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto.

The plan had originated during the Abyssinian crisis of the mid nineteen thirties and had been regularly updated. The aircraft carrier Glorious and her air group of Fairey Swordfish had trained and practised for the attack in 1939. Since the entry of Italy into the war in Late June the RN had been preparing to carry out the plan. With the Italians sending regular supply convoys to Italian North Africa the Italian fleet based in Taranto had been reinforced and was acting as a ‘fleet in being’ and thus tying down valuable RN resources that were needed elseware. With Operation Compass being planned to start in December the time to strike would be in the correct moon phase in mid November. As part of the deception plan the Navy were keen to do a major aircraft re supply run to Malta. Three aircraft carriers seen filling their decks with land planes in Gibraltar, by the Germans Spanish friends meant they were highly unlikely to be part of an attack on the Italian fleet!

Aircraft resupply trips into the Mediterranean had become known as ‘Club Runs’ and this was planned to be the largest yet. With Glorious, Courageous and Furious all participating in what was known as Operation White. This would deliver some eighty four Hurricanes in one go. Courageous and Glorious would carry their full complement of Folland Fighters and Fairey Albacores. Furious would retain only six of her Follond falcon fighters for self defence and they would only be usable once all the Hurricanes had flown off.

Operation MB8 would now consist of seven interlink elements, these being,

Operation White, Glorious, Courageous and Furious, delivering aircraft to Malta.

Operation Coat, reinforcement convoy to Malta. The convoy includes the battleship HMS Barham and the heavy cruisers HMS Glasgow and Berwick. They are accompanied by HMS Ark Royal.

Convoy MW 3 Three empty merchant men bound for Malta then sailed on the 4th November arriving 10th November escort including cruiser HMS Coventry

Convoy ME 3 Four Merchant ships in ballast with heavy escort, Including Battleship HMS Ramillies and HMS Coventry Sails on the 11th November from Malta arrives Alexandria 13th November

Convoy AN6 Four slow tankers to Greece escort includes Cruisers HMS Ajax and HMAS Sydney as force B delivering materials and men to Crete. HMS Orion a light cruiser carrying RAF personnel to Greece forms Force C, on the night 11/12 November force B and C will combine as force X and make an offensive foray into the Otranto Strait.

Operation Crack, Aircraft from HMS Courageous, HMS Glorious and HMS Furious Attack airfields and Facilities around Cagliari on Sardinia as they return to Gibraltar form operation White

Operation Judgement. Consisting of the carrier HMS Illustrious, with the battleships HMS Warspite, Valiant and Malay were to be joined by the battleship HMS Ramallies from convoy ME 3 and the heavy cruisers HMS Glouster and York plus three destroyers from Convoy MW 3. The final element of the operation Judgement force would be the Aircraft Carrier HMS Ark Royal joining from operation Coat.

The Three aircraft carriers taking part in operation White would leave Gibraltar after the Operation Coat Convoy and catch up with it before Cape Bone. Here it would come under the protection of aircraft from Ark Royal whilst the RAF fighters were flown off to Malta. Once their decks were clear Furious, Courageous and Glorious would provide air cover for the Operation Coat Convoy until Malta based aircraft could take over.

This would permit Ark Royal to team south and east around Malta to join operation Judgement.

Furious would cross deck some Fairey Albacores from both Courageous and Glorious so that when they had finished providing air cover to Operation Coat they could launch bigger strike more quickly to hit the airfield and other facilities at Cagilari on Sicily. To further cause the Italians confusion the Aircraft attacking Cagilari would bear squadrons codes for HMS, Ark Royal, Courageous, and Glorious.

Despite the maritime ballet required and the complication of movement each element served a purpose and made the core of the entire enterprise, the attack on Taranto possible.

That attack would be undertaken by Twenty four albacores flying from HMS Invincible and a further twenty four from Ark Royal. Twelve aircraft from each carrier would comprise the first wave. Six would carry torpedoes , two would carry flares and four bombs of 250lb each. The final four would carry one fifteen hundred pound ‘longbow bomb’. This long thin bomb that fits in place of an 18 inch torpedo and had an explosive content of fifty percent. Though not designed to be armoured piercing it has a relatively thick nose casing and has dual fusing, having both time delay and solvent fuses. In operation Judgement it was intended that with the shallow sea bed a near miss with a ‘Longbow’ would do nearly as much damage as a direct hit by stoving in the hull. Ark Royal’s torpedo aircraft would attack from the northwest of the harbour and Invincible, aircraft from the south west. The latest photographic reconnaissance picture showed all six Italian Battles ships anchored in a group in the Mar Grand close to Taranto town with three heavy cruises lying together further offshore.

Flares would be dropped on the east of the Mar Grand. The flare droppers then using their two hundred and fifty bound bombs to attack the oil storage tanks. The eight other bomb carrying aircraft were detailed to attack the heavy cruisers in the Mar Grand and Mar Piccilo First wave torpedo aircraft were instructed to attack the six battle ships in the Mar Grand as their primary target. Each pair was assigned a ship to attack identified by its location from the latest reconnaissance photographs.

The second wave scheduled to arrive half an hour later had the same composition but slightly different instructions. Their primary target s were any undamaged Battle ships, secondary targets were the heavy cruisers. The flare dropping aircraft had the same instructions as the first wave. The four aircraft from each carrier carrying ‘Longbow’ bombs were given the destroyer and light cruiser trots in the Mar Piccolo as their primary target and the docks as their secondary one.

Discussing all this with Sir Arthur , Sir Hugh and Sir Phillip asked what the navy wanted from the RAF. Sir Arthur suggested that an attack by the RAF Wellingtons dropping Aerial mines commencing just as the flare dropping air craft completed their runs could very well distract the Italians enough to improve the chances of the torpedo carrying aircraft. . There had been some discussion over whether the Aerial mine was the best ordinance for the job, whilst in its sea mine mode it could do serious damage to a battleship, the chances of one being triggered was slight and the falling mines might not really be noticed by the Italians and therefore provide little or no distraction. Sir Hugh suggested that the Wellingtons could carry two standard fifteen hundred pound Mk I-IV mines and that if half the bombers in each squadron carried a full load of mixed AP and HC bombs this would enhance the distraction and might obscure the location of the mines when dropped, this was agreed in principle with a second wave of two squadrons timed to arrive with the second wave of FAA aircraft carrying the same ordinance load.

The final decision was that the first RAF attack would use two thirds of the aircraft carrying five hundred pound bombs and the other four using Aerial Mines. The second wave would carry Aerial Mines only, with eight being tasked with mining the Mar Grand and the other four tasked with hitting the Mar Piccolo and the dock yard.
There had been some discussion as to whether the first two operational squadrons of RAF Bomber Command Stirlings could also make a worthwhile contribution. They had the range to do a shuttle attack from the UK to Egypt via Taranto and could deliver eight thousand pounds of ordinance. Whilst very tempting as an idea Sir Hugh, ventured that the Squadrons were not yet operationaly mature enough to carry out such a mission, even with the best navigation training and the use of the brand new mark fourteen bomb site the chance that they would hit anything of importance would be unlikely. Basically the potential losses were not proportional to the probable damage to the enemy.
Sir Arthur noted at this point that some FAA officers were predicting losses of around fifty percent in this attack. However he was of the opinion that two squadrons of Wellingtons flying from Malta and two squadrons flying from bases in Egypt would be a significant addition to the alarm and despondency caused the Italian Navy by this operation. The attack on Taranto had originally been planned for Trafalgar day on the twenty first of October but the entire operation had been delayed due to problems with the dropping of torpedoes in such shallow water using the Albacore aircraft. When the attack was first muted the FAA torpedo aircraft was the Swordfish, the torpedoes had been modified for dropping from the Swordfish. When the Albacore replaced it and new tests on shallow water torpedo dropping had been carried out on a live torpedo training run the majority of the torpedoes struck bottom causing a hasty redesign of the additional appendages used for shallow water drops and an enforced delay of the attack date.

Both Sir Hugh and Sir Phillip had followed the opening gambits of Operation MB8 with great interest and some trepidation. When the bulk of the Hurricanes arrived safely on Malta there were audible sighs of relieve.

On the Morning of the twelve of November Sir Hugh was relieved to get the casualty returns from the four squadrons involved in operation Judgement, Only two aircraft had been lost on the operation. One had aborted on the way to the target due to engine problems and one other been written off in a bad landing on Malta. Stone walls and Wellington bombers do not make for a good ending. All in all not as bad as Sir Hugh had thought probable. As to the FAA He had not yet heard from the Admiralty and the reconnaissance Maryland from Malta had not yet returned.

Late on the twelve Sir Hugh Dowding was informed of the triumph of the navy at Taranto. Basically the heavy units of the Italian navy had been wiped out as a fighting force for some time. Initial analysis of the reconnaissance photographs from Malta had indicated that of the six battle ships anchored in the Mar Grand at Taranto, One was capsized, one was awash and listing heavily to port. Another was heavily down by the bow and aground. Of the other three two were surrounded by large oil slicks and appeared either to be bottomed by counter flooding or riding very deep. The last one appeared to be undamaged though the photo interpretation people were waiting for prints to arrive in the UK as they were intrigued by the shadows cast by this ship in the early morning light. Off the three heavy cruisers in the outer harbour, one showed serious bomb damage aft and another one was listing to starboard, the third appeared untouched. In the Mar Piccolo damage assessment was made difficult by palls of smoke rising from the dock yard and the vicinity of the Destroyer trots. In any event it was an amazing result and no doubt Sir Hugh and Sir Phillip would hear the full story in due course. Sir Hugh had enquired of his brother how bad the losses were, with an audible smile in his voice Sir Arthur replied that only five aircraft of the forty five that actually took part in the raid had been lost and there was a good chance that some of the fifteen missing airman had survived.

The icing on the cake was that force X had intercepted an Italian convoy in the straits of Otranto and had sunk all four of the merchant ships in it and one of the escort without receiving any significant damage in response.

Later intelligence analysis would clarify just how much damage the Italian ships had suffered but on an initial perusal, the photographs led the Admiralty to the conclusion that they had total superiority in the Mediterranean for a least three to four months and that as many convoys as possible should be pushed though to both supply Malta and to transit the Mediterranean so as to hurry supplies and materials to Egypt to support operation Compass.
Analysing the effectiveness of the four Wellington Squadrons was more difficult. However in Both Malta and Egypt senior FAA officers visited the Squadrons involved with sufficient naval rum for enough tots to well and truly splice the Main Brace.

Good to see this continuing, and this version of Taranto helped fill in the hole left by The Whale Has Wings.

Thoresby

Some Bloke

Wouldn't Invincible be carrying Sea Harriers?

What damage did Courageous, Glorious and Furious do in the end with Operation Crack.

Sonofpegasus

Sonofpegasus

11.07. Defence and Offence, two side, of war.

As the recent raid on Taranto had shown it was not just the weight of bombs dropped and where you dropped them that mattered, it was also important to have available the right ordinance to do the most damage to the specific target . Under the auspices of the CSSOAO a number of sub committees had been set up. The Bombsight Committee was chaired by Patrick Blackett, the Bomb Damage Assessment committee, The Bomb Fusing committee and several others were all working on making Bomber Command more effective, whilst some of the Committees analysed enemy action for lessons learnt, others examined practical and scientific opportunities fo improvement, The secret minutes of these committees were circulated to the chairs of all the committees, in this way cross pollination of both thought and effort was maintained. A scientific mind completely dissociated with the problem under consideration often came up with a crucial insight. This kind of cooperate analysis had been a corner stone of the work at AMRE Bawdsey Manor, from the start of the RAF research effort in Cheltenham what had become, the Telecommunications Research Establishment, continued that ethos which had been epitomised by the ‘Sunday Soviets’ and discussions on and around the boundary during cricket matches at AMRS Bawdsey Manor. Upon arrival in Cheltenham in the late summer of nineteen thirty nine ‘Taffy’ Bowen and others had been delighted to be invited to play cricket on the College Fields.

In the summer evenings of 1940 it was not uncommon to see one or two games in progress in front of the school cricket pavillion with casual observers walking past having no inkling of the secracy of the discusions taking place on the boundry, Here a group might include Alec Harley Reeves, “ Frank “ Edgar Jones, Ronald Victor Jones, discussing Nickerbine and radio navigation, whilst nearby Bernard Lovell, Joan Elizebeth Curran, Samuel Crowe, James Sayers, ”Mark” Olithant and others. Who might be discussing magnatrons, proximity fuses or a myrid other related technicsl subjects. When Sir Phillip visited the TRE, He was unfailingly impressed with the intelectuall talent that had been mobalised from the scientific community . Now in late autumn as the days grew shorter the work on perfecting many of these new systems continued with a quite intensity.

Shortly after becoming CAS, Sir Hugh had been whisked off to Cheltenham to attend a number of presentations on the work being done at the TRE. Later behind locked doors Sir Phillip and Sir Hugh sat in the office of ‘Taffy Bowen’ whilst R.V. Jones, passed his transcript of the ‘Oslow’ letters to Sir Hugh to read. Having read them Sir Hugh had enquired as to the veracity of their content, Here Sir Phillip stated, was the problem, within certain circles of the British intelligence community, the ‘Oslow Letters’ were seem as being too detailed and wide ranging in their scientific detail of Nazi research and development to be true, these people had therefore dismissed the letters as a plant to mislead the British into wasting time and effort chasing phantom projects.

R.V. Jones countered by saying that he had as a scientist come to the opposite conclusion. In that the science within the letters, particularly on RDF and other electronics was fundamentally sound. Further all the scientific information was consistent with working practices and methodology of known German scientists and institutions. Summarising the letters R.V. Jones said that the British had been given by a disaffected German scientist a snapshot of German electronic secret research as of early 1940 and that it was being officially ignored by the Intelligence community. In the TRE however it certainly was not being ignored it was informing a lot of the work carried out by 80 wing and at same time the PRU were when possibly try to get photographic confirmation of the activity at some of the sites noted in the letter. As Sir Phillip commented in a war of ‘move and counter move’ having a crib sheet of your opponents moves could be invaluable.

R.V. Jones concluded, that in his capacity as the Goverments Advisor on Scientific Intellegence it was issential that as the, CAS, Sir Hugh should fully appraised of the contents of the Oslo Letters and the importance of this information, hence the briefing. The discussion then turned to use, by the Luftwaffe of Lorence based electronic bombing aids, these were known as ‘The Beams’ so far the scientists working at TRE and the RAF flying in 80 Wing had managed to identify the frequencies used and had worked out the methodology and expected accuracy. The crudest counter measure available was to simply jamb the tramitters with electronic noise. This would only serve to alert the Gremans to the fact that their wave lengths had been compromised,

The more sophisticated counter measure was to ‘spoof’ or bend the beams. The beam system known to the Germans as Knickerbien utilised a track beam with its transmitter near Kleve and a cross beam transmitted from Stollberg near the Danish border. By sending a series of dots synchronised to the original German signals it was possible to widen the track beam to such an extent that bombers would fail to lock on and wander on a curve away from the track. As Knickerbien was known as ‘headache’ to the British the counter broadcast system was code named ‘Asprin’.

The Oslo letter had contained details of a newer and more accurate guidance systems and the scientists at TRE and 80 Wing had been urgently seeking evidence of this new system that bore the name X-Gerat (X-Aperatus). The first use of X-Gerat had been on December 20th 1939 and since then much data had been collected, the new beam frequency had been found at 1500/2000Mhz, this was much higher than the original Knickerbein system at 60 Mhz, therefore giving a far more accurate and narrower beam. Intellegencce intercepts had confirmed that this new beam from a transmitter near Cherbourg had the code name Wesser, with the three cross beams being also named after rivers, namely the Rhine, Oder and Elbe. The Rhine cross beam was the preparety warning line approxemetly thirty kilometres before beam Oder, which was the clock setting line, five kilometres later was the Elbe beam line wich was the clock rundown start line and five kilometres later was the automatic bomb release point. Unlike Knickerbein, X-Gerat was not fitted in every bomber and top secret traffic analysis had confirmed that a bomber unit called KGR 100 was a specialised bomber Kampfgruppe set up to use this system for precision bombing of targets and to mark targets for following bombing waves. By early November much intelligence had been gained, a analysis of a raid by KGR 100 on Birmingham had shown that the majority of the bombs had fallen within a band one hundred meters wide centered on the Wesser Beam with a length spread of just over a furlong, accuracy almost unobtainable by the RAF even in daylight. This came as a shock and revelation to the RAF.

Having located the guide beams transmitter near Cherbourg the RAF and AM intelligence analysed the band variance for major targets in the midlands. Francis Chichester had made the point that spoofing X-Gerat during attacks on easily located targets such as Liverpool and the Whirrel on the coast would be pointless, but attacks on the industrial complexes around. Wolverhampton. Birmingham, Coventry and Castle Bromwich could be more easily spoofed convincingly by using decoy fires and flares. A number of sites to the south of these targets were selected and quickly prepared as decoys utilising the same equipment and methods as the already existing QF sites for decoy airfields, The spoofing system used to counter X-Gerrat, was to broadcast an artificial and early Elbe signal Only one kilometre after the Oder signal and hence causing the bombs to be automatically dropped some eight kilometres short of the target. For the British the biggest problem here was the Luftwaffe had learnt from the successful jamming of the Knickerbien system, due to how early it was turned on, and were now delaying the transmission of the Rhine, Oder and Elbe lines as long as possible. This therefore gave the counter measure teams a very short time to identify the true Elbe line and Spoof it.
On the 6th of November the RAF had an intelligence coup, a bomber from KGR 100 was brought down by a night fighter and crash landed on the beach at West Bay near Bridport. Despite the wrecked aircraft being submerged by the rising tide an RAF intelligence recovery team managed to salvage the X-Gerrat equipment. Examination of the apparatus at the TRE quickly confirmed that the working frequency was filtered to precisely 2000Mhz and any jamming signal had to ne very accurately tuned.

To counter the use of X-Gerrat during the next major raid on the midlands a comprehensive defense scheme had been planned. As soon as intelligence, being signals analysis or intercepts’, indicated that KGR100 were preparing for a raid and the Wesser transmition was detected in the Birmingham target area then the plan would be activated. The Night fighters would be concentrated on the lead element of the raid, this was to intended to disrupt KGR 100 and inflict casualties on it.
General Pyle at AA command had concentrated as many guns as possible south of the Birmingham Target area to help convince the German bomb aimers that they were truly approaching their designated target, Guns to the north would remain silent unless the true target area was breached. The next phase was general jamming on the 2000Mhz frequency to disrupt the X-Gerrat signal and make accurate bombing more difficult. This Jamming would hopefully also disguise the false Elbe signal and make it harder to counter. Finally false flares, fires and explosions on the ground under the false target point would be set off in a further attempt to convince the following attacking bomber waves to attack the decoy target. The last two kilometres of the bombing run would be on a known track along the beam at a constant altitude. General Pyle organised all the AA guns in the area of the spoof target with the range to engage aircraft on the track to do so. These guns would be director controlled using the new 25cm tacking and ranging RDF systems with their distinctive parabolic aerials designed by Bernard Lovell and his team.

Sometimes in warfare there is a synchronicity of events that if wtitten in a novel would be decried as unbelievable, the bomber raid on Coventry was one such event. The plan to spoof X-Gerrat had only been finalised on the eigth of of November. All of the various elements already existed and the recovery of a complete X-gerat unit two days earler was the icing on the cake.

So it was that the raid on Coventry on the night of the eleventh and twelve of November would see the next major confrontation it what had become known at the TRE and in the AM as ‘The Battle of the Beams’


An Illustrious Class Of Carriers

The first of the new armored carriers to be commissioned was HMS Illustrious, on April 5, 1939. It was followed by Formidable, commissioned on August 17, 1939, and Victorious, which was commissioned a month later on September 14. The three armored carriers are sometimes considered to make up the Illustrious class they were followed by Indomitable, which was very similar in design except that it had two hanger decks and was unique in this regard. Implacable and Indefatigable were also armored carriers, but even though they were very similar to the Illustrious-class carriers, the two ships are often placed into a class by themselves. They were not commissioned until 1942 and did not enter service until the last years of the war. All six carriers were of equal displacement, each at 23,000 tons. They were capable of carrying from 36 to 50 aircraft, depending on the size of the airplanes.


A History of the Army Air Corps

The Army Air Corps were the U.S. military service dedicated to aerial warfare between 1926 and 1941. It coalesced as aviation evolved from a component of ground-based infantry tactics into its own branch of the military. It became the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) on June 20, 1941 to signify greater autonomy from the Army’s command structure. It remained as a combat arm of the Army until 1947, when the Department of the Air Force was established.

Scroll down to see articles about the Army Air Corps and the USAAF.

Click here to see more articles in this category.

Army Air Corps of the U.S. Military

By the end of 1941 the army air forces had grown substantially but had a long way to go. General Henry H. Arnold commanded a service of twenty-five thousand officers and men, with four thousand aircraft. That year President Franklin Roosevelt called for production of fifty thousand planes, Hermann Göering reportedly laughed at the notion, yet American industry in fact delivered ninety-six thousand to the U.S. services and Allied nations in 1944 alone. At war’s end the army air corps comprised seventy-five thousand planes and 2.5 million men—in four years, a hundred-fold increase in personnel and nearly nineteen-fold in aircraft.

Eighth U.S. Army Air Force

In 1942 the ‘‘Mighty Eighth’’ came to Britain, where it experienced a lengthy, painful gestation period. Its mission of conducting precision daylight bombing of German industry was hampered, as bomber and fighter groups originally assigned to Gen. Ira Eaker’s fledgling force were constantly siphoned off to support the North African and Mediterranean theaters. Additionally, a period of heavy bomber losses threatened morale during 1943, causing doubt whether the daylight air offensive could be sustained. However, by the start of 1944 the Eighth had evolved into a powerful striking arm and was growing stronger. Increasingly capable long-range fighter escorts reduced bomber losses to acceptable levels. It was among the best of the army air corps.

The composition of USAAF units was standardized by 1943. A heavy bombardment group with B-17s or B-24s had four squadrons, each of which typically put up nine planes per mission. Fighter groups had three squadrons, divided into three or four flights of four each. Thus, full-strength bomb groups flew about thirty-six aircraft, while fighter units launched thirty-six to forty-eight planes. The number of planes dispatched on a specific mission depended on maintenance, crew availability, and the nature of the target.

At the time of D-Day the Eighth Air Force numbered forty-one bomb groups, fifteen fighter groups, two special-mission groups, two photo-recon groups, and several independent units. Eighth Bomber Command operated three air divisions: the First, with a dozen B-17 groups the Third, comprising eleven B-17 Flying Fortress and three B-24 Liberator groups and the all-Liberator Second Division, with fourteen B-24 groups.

Fighter Command comprised six P-47 Thunderbolt groups, five P-51 Mustang groups, and four still-flying P-38 Lightnings. All the Lightnings were gone within months, replaced by Mustangs. By VE-Day only one Eighth Fighter Command group still flew Thunderbolts.

Bombers of the Mighty Eighth launched 2,362 sorties on 6 June, with merely three Liberators shot down. Most targets were German coastal defenses or transport systems, but poor weather (a widespread undercast) hampered bombing efforts.

Ninth U.S. Army Air Force

The U.S. Army had two army air corps based in Great Britain, with operations after D-Day expected on the continent. The Ninth was the tactical air force, trained and equipped to support Allied ground forces. Originally established and based in northwest Africa, the Ninth moved to England in August 1943 and built up to its June 1944 strength of forty-five groups deployed in eleven combat wings.

The Ninth’s eighteen fighter groups (plus two reconnaissance groups) operated under the Ninth and Nineteenth Tactical Air Commands, with three and two wings, respectively. Probably the most influential tactical air commander was Maj. Gen. Elwood R. Quesada of the Ninth TAC. At the time of D-Day by far the most widely flown fighter was the Republic P-47, which was extremely well suited to the fighter-bomber role. Thirteen groups flew Thunderbolts, while three were equipped with Lockheed P-38s and two with North American’s P-51. A photo group and a tactical reconnaissance group flew ‘‘recce’’ versions of the P-38 and P-51—the F-5 and F-6, respectively.

Eleven tactical bomb groups constituted Ninth Bomber Command, under Brig. Gen. Samuel E. Anderson. He controlled three bomb wings of three or four groups each: eight groups with Martin’s sleek B-26 Marauder and three with Douglas A-20 Havocs. As with the Eighth Air Force, bomb groups comprised four squadrons, fighter groups three.

Of direct importance to Overlord was Ninth Troop Carrier Command, with fourteen Douglas C-47/C-53 groups in three wings. Both types were military versions of the enormously successful DC-3 airliner the C-47 Skytrain was capable of towing gliders as well as delivering parachutists, while C-53 Skytroopers carried only troops. Seventeen Skytrains were shot down on D-Day.

On 6 June the Ninth Air Force lost only twenty-two combat aircraft from 3,342 sorties: seven P-47s, six B-26s, five A-20s, two P-38s, and two F-6s.

Airborne Units of the Army Air Corps

In the fifteenth century Leonardo Da Vinci envisioned airborne soldiers, and in the nineteenth century Napoleon Bonaparte pondered invading Britain with French troops in hot-air balloons. But not until the 1940s did the technology exist to transport large numbers of specially trained soldiers behind enemy lines and deliver them by parachute, glider, or transport aircraft.

German army airborne units included paratroops and glider and transport-lifted infantry, all controlled by the Luftwaffe. Eventually nine parachute divisions were established, but few Fallschirmjaeger (literally ‘‘parachute hunters’’) made combat jumps. Nonetheless, Germany led the way in combat airborne operations, seizing Belgium’s Fort Eben Emael in 1940. The Luftwaffe also made history in the first aerial occupation of an island—the costly Crete operation in 1941. However, Germany’s Pyrrhic victory proved so costly that no Fallschirmjaeger division was again involved in a major airborne operation. Thereafter, the Luftwaffe parachute forces were employed as light infantry in every theater of operation. Two German airborne divisions, the Third and Fifth, responded to the Allied invasion in Normandy but were hampered by inadequate ground transport.

The British army authorized small army airborne units in 1940 but did not form the Parachute Regiment until 1942. That unit served as a training organization, producing seventeen battalions, of which fourteen were committed to combat. The battalions were formed into the First and Sixth Airborne Divisions, the latter involved in Operation Overlord. Both divisions were committed to the Arnhem assault, Operation Market-Garden, in September 1944.

The U.S. Army formed five army airborne units and divisions during World War II, of which three (the Eighty-second, 101st, and Seventeenth) saw combat in the Mediterranean or the European Theater of Operations. The Eleventh served in the Pacific the Thirteenth went to Europe in 1945 but was not committed to combat.

Apart from isolated uses of airborne battalions, the first Allied army airborne units operation of note occurred during Operation Husky, the Anglo-American invasion of Sicily in July 1943. Subsequent operations on the Italian mainland perfected doctrine and techniques so that by 1944 the United States and Britain could integrate three airborne divisions into the plan for Overlord. By isolating the vulnerable beachheads from German reinforcements during the critical early hours of 6 June, the airborne troopers gained valuable time for the amphibious forces.

Later uses of British and American army airborne units included the Arnhem operation in September 1944 and the Rhine crossing in March 1945.

Airborne operations were considered high-risk undertakings, requiring commitment of large numbers of valuable assets—elite troops and airlift—and incurring the danger of assault troops being isolated and overwhelmed. The latter occurred on a large scale only once, when supporting Allied ground forces were unable to reach British paratroopers at Arnhem, Holland, in September 1944.

Army Airborne Units in D-Day

Because they were by definition light infantry—without armored vehicles or heavy artillery—paratroopers were laden with enormous personal burdens. Many D-Day troopers carried nearly two hundred pounds of equipment, including their main and reserve chutes, life preserver, primary and secondary weapons and ammunition, water and rations, radios or mines, and other gear. It could take as much as five minutes for a trooper to pull on his parachute harness over his other equipment, and if they sat on the ground many men needed help standing up.

Normal parameters for dropping paratroopers were six hundred feet of altitude at ninety miles per hour airspeed. Owing to weather and tactical conditions, however, many troopers were dropped from 300 to 2,100 feet and at speeds as high as 150 miles per hour.

American paratroopers had to make five qualifying jumps to earn their wings, after which they received a hazardous-duty bonus of fifty dollars per month, ‘‘jump pay.’’

The U.S. Eighty-second and 101st Airborne Divisions dropped 13,400 men behind Utah Beach on the west end of the Allied landing areas, while nearly seven thousand men of the British Sixth Division secured bridges behind Sword Beach to the east. The primary objective of the airborne troops was to isolate the beachhead flanks from substantial German reinforcement the British were more successful than the Americans in doing so. The Sixth Division’s seizure of the Orne River bridges became a classic airborne operation.

The elite of the elite among paratroopers were the pathfinders, who were first on the ground. Preceding the main force by nearly an hour, the pathfinders were responsible for guiding troop-carrier aircraft to the landing zones and for marking the target areas. Specialized navigational equipment included the Eureka/Rebecca radar beacon, which transmitted to the lead aircraft in each C-47 formation, and automatic direction-finder (ADF) radios. Holophane lights were laid in T patterns on the ground to mark each drop zone.

Owing to fog, enemy action, and the confusion common to warfare, in Overlord only one of the eighteen U.S. pathfinder teams arrived at the correct drop zone. One entire eight-man team was dropped into the English Channel.

Because of wide dispersion over the Cotentin Peninsula, only about one-third of the American paratroopers assembled themselves under organized leadership, and many landed in the wrong divisional areas. One battalion commander roamed alone for five days, killing six Germans without finding another American. While some troopers sought cover or got drunk on Calvados wine, many others displayed the initiative expected of elite troops. In Normandy the airborne was especially effective in disrupting German communications.

Glider-borne infantry regiments were part of every airborne division, and though they did not originally receive ‘‘jump pay,’’ these soldiers were still part of an elite organization. Gliders possessed the dual advantages of delivering a more concentrated force to the landing zone and providing certain heavy equipment unavailable to paratroopers—especially light artillery and reconnaissance vehicles. Gliders were usually flown by noncommissioned pilots, who, once on the ground, took up personal weapons and fought as part of the infantry units they had delivered to the target.

Army Air Corps and their British Counterpart

Avro Lancaster

The Lancaster evolved from the Avro firm’s ill-fated Manchester to become one of the great bombers of World War II. With two Rolls-Royce Vulture engines, the Manchester lacked reliability for combat operations and was abandoned after limited production. However, to retrieve as much of the investment as possible, Avro extended the Manchester’s wings and put four Merlins on its airframe pilots were delighted with the result.

The Lancaster Mark I could carry a maximum load of fourteen thousand pounds, and though the average operational loadout was much less, the potential was easily recognized. Stable, easy to fly, and capable of 280 mph at altitudes above most other RAF bombers, the ‘‘Lanc’’ was loved by its aircrews.

Though not built in the variety of its Halifax stablemate, the Lancaster nevertheless demonstrated its versatility. The most famous Lancaster mission occurred in 1943, when No. 617 Squadron’s modified Avros made low-level attacks on the Rhine dams using Dr. Barnes Wallis’s revolutionary skip bombs. The same squadron later used Wallis’s awesome eleven-ton ‘‘earthquake’’ bombs. On 6 June 1944 Lancasters participated in saturation bombing of German coastal batteries to suppress opposition on the beaches, as well as in attacks on the Le Havre river bridges.

From 1941 to 1945 some eighty Lancaster squadrons flew 156,000 sorties over Occupied Europe, dropping 681,000 tons of bombs—an average of 4,300 pounds of bombs per sortie. The Lanc’s peak strength occurred in August 1944 with forty-two operational squadrons, including four Royal Canadian Air Force, two Australian, and one Polish manned. Attrition was heavy, especially during the ‘‘Battle of Berlin’’ in early 1944, but production exceeded 7,300 aircraft (87 percent were Mark I and III) from six manufacturers, including Victory Aircraft in Canada.

Bristol Beaufighter

German defenses and coastal shipping. The type also was deployed against Japan, and 364 of the total 5,928 were built under license in Australia.

DeHavilland Mosquito

The plywood Mosquito was a serious challenger for the title of most versatile aircraft of World War II. It performed virtually every mission asked of a land-based aircraft: day and night fighter, light bomber and nocturnal intruder, antishipping and photo-reconnaissance aircraft. The ‘‘Mossie’’ accomplished each task with excellent results and was so successful that Germany attempted to build its own Moskito.

Like Bristol’s Beaufighter, the Mosquito was conceived as an in-house project by the DeHavilland Company. In 1938 the lightweight, twin-engine DH-98 was regarded as a fast, unarmed bomber. The molded plywood airframe gave rise to the nickname ‘‘Wooden Wonder,’’ but the RAF was slow to warm to the concept. However, work progressed, and the prototype first flew in November 1940.

Mosquitos were produced in startling variety, with approximately twenty fighter and thirty bomber variants from 1941 onward. Throughout the type’s life it was powered by two Rolls-Royce Merlins rated between 1,230 and 1,700 horsepower. Exceptionally fast, some marks were capable of 425 miles per hour at altitude, and during the V-1 ‘‘Buzz Bomb’’ campaign of 1944–45, Mosquitos were among the most successful aircraft at intercepting and destroying the speedy robot bombs.

Entering squadron service in 1942, Mosquitos proved ideal for the pathfinder mission, marking target areas for multi-engine bombers. They also performed low-level strikes against precision targets, such as Gestapo headquarters in Oslo and the Nazi prison at Amiens.

RAF Coastal Command valued the Mosquito as a partner to the Bristol Beaufighter in the antishipping role. Long-range missions against German-controlled shipping in Scandinavian waters were flown with rockets and heavy cannon armament. Mosquitos also logged combat in the Middle East and the Pacific, while American reconnaissance squadrons flew them in Europe and Africa.

During the Normandy campaign, RAF squadrons committed a monthly average of not quite three hundred Mosquitos. From June through August, seventy were shot down and twenty-eight damaged beyond repair—33 percent of the total available.

Mosquito production approached seven thousand, built in Britain, Canada, and Australia, with the last aircraft delivered in 1948. Mosquito pilots and navigators were proud of their machine, knowing they flew one of the most capable combat aircraft of its generation.

Fairey Swordfish

One of the most remarkable military aircraft of all time, the Swordfish was a biplane designed in 1933 and was still in combat in 1945. It was conceived as a carrier-based torpedo plane powered by a Pegasus radial engine of some six hundred horsepower, with a nominal crew of three: pilot, observer, and gunner.

The Mark I entered Royal Navy service in 1936 and appeared little different from most carrier planes of its day—an open-cockpit biplane. Already regarded as obsolete when war began three years later, the ‘‘Stringbag’’ had, however, the priceless advantage of availability. It proved its worth repeatedly over the next few years, including a stunningly successful night torpedo and bombing attack on the Italian fleet in Taranto Harbor in 1940. The example set by Fleet Air Arm Swordfish so impressed the Japanese navy that the Pearl Harbor operation was based in part on the Taranto strike.

In 1941 Swordfish off HMS Ark Royal torpedoed the German battleship Bismarck in the North Atlantic, leading to her destruction by surface forces. That same year Swordfish attacked Italian ships in the Mediterranean battle off Cape Matapan. In 1942 the land-based Swordfish attempted to stop the ‘‘Channel Dash’’ by German battle cruisers and were nearly all destroyed by German fighters.

Perhaps the Swordfish’s greatest contribution during its long service was in the realm of antisubmarine warfare. Flying from escort carriers, late-model aircraft with radar persistently hunted U-boats in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and northern waters. During D-Day, land-based Swordfish conducted antisubmarine patrols in the Channel and its approaches.

Nearly 2,400 of the type were constructed, and one of the many ironies of the Swordfish’s career is that it outlived its intended replacement, Fairey’s closed-cockpit Albacore. Even when the more advanced Barracuda monoplane arrived in fleet squadrons, the ‘‘Stringbag’’ soldiered on, in its own way irreplaceable.

Handley-Page Halifax

The four-engine, twin-tail Halifax bore a general resemblance to its more famous counterpart, the Avro Lancaster, and shared the ‘‘Lanc’s’’ rags-to-riches story. The Lancaster evolved from the Avro Manchester similarly, the Halifax began life on the drawing board as a twin-engine bomber but was altered to the multi-engine configuration. Originally powered by four 1,280 hp Rolls-Royce Merlins, the Halifax Mark I first flew in October 1939, barely a month after the war began. However, developmental problems delayed its combat debut until March 1941. The original version, as well as the Mark II and V, retained Merlins until increased demand for Lancasters, Spitfires, and Mosquitos mandated an engine change.

The most common Halifax variants were the Mark III, VI, and VII, all powered by Bristol Hercules air-cooled radials of 1,600 to 1,800 horsepower. The later models also had a different silhouette, with the original front turret deleted in favor of a more streamlined nose to improve top speed. The Mark III was rated at 277 mph.

Halifaxes dominated RAF Bomber Command’s No. 4 and 6 Groups but also flew in Coastal Command and Transport Command. Like most British bombers, the Halifax was a single-pilot aircraft, with six other men completing the crew: flight engineer, bombardier (bomb aimer in the RAF), navigator, and gunners. In four years of RAF Bomber Command operations, Halifaxes logged 75,500 sorties with an average bomb load of three thousand pounds.

Extremely versatile, the Handley-Page bomber doubled as a maritime patrol plane, electronic countermeasures platform, paratroop transport, and glider tug. The latter duty was an especially important aspect of the Halifax’s contribution to Overlord. In June 1944 at least twenty Halifax squadrons flew from the UK with Bomber Command while others served in the Mediterranean theater.

Total production was 6,176 aircraft, including some postwar manufacture. The type remained in RAF service until 1952.

Hawker Typhoon

The 1938 replacement design for the Hawker Hurricane was the Typhoon, probably the heaviest and potentially the most powerful singleseat fighter proposed until that time. Originally called the Tornado, following a series of engine changes it emerged as the Typhoon in early 1940.However, a difficult development period occupied the next year and a half before engine and airframe problems were resolved.

The first production Typhoon was tested in May 1941 with the 2,200 hp Sabre IIA engine. The new fighter was committed to combat sooner than it should have been, but by late 1942 it was successfully defending British airspace from Luftwaffe hit-and-run raids. Maximum speed was 417 mph at 20,500 feet.

The ‘‘Tiffy’’ earned a hard-won reputation as an excellent tactical support aircraft. Distinctive with its chin-mounted radiator, its rugged airframe was able to withstand considerable battle damage and still return home. The Typhoon’s armament was optimized for ground attack, with four 20 mm cannon and underwing rails for eight rockets as well as two five hundred-pound bombs.

These rugged British planes were ideally suited for the ground-attack role, and Typhoons took a major toll on German armor and transport during the Normandy campaign.

During the Normandy and Falaise campaigns, Typhoons perfected ‘‘cab rank’’ tactics and reported a heavy toll of German transport and armor (one thousand tanks and twelve thousand other vehicles were claimed) but sustained heavy losses. From June through August, 243 Typhoons were lost in action and 173 damaged beyond repair, the heaviest loss rate of any RAF aircraft in the campaign. Hawker produced 3,300 Typhoons before the type was phased out in favor of the bigger, faster Tempest in 1944. Tempests played a limited role in the Normandy campaign, with an average monthly availability of fifty-fifty aircraft.

Short Sunderland

The Short Brothers company gained considerable prewar experience with its ‘‘Empire’’ series of transoceanic airliners, so it was no surprise that the Sunderland became Britain’s premier flying boat of the Second World War. The prototype, first flown in October 1937, was powered by four 1,065 hp Pegasus radial engines. The Mark V, delivered in 1943, used American Pratt and Whitney radials of 1,200 horsepower. With as many as a dozen crewmen, the big boat had enormous range (nearly three thousand miles) and could remain airborne for more than thirteen hours, cruising at about 135 mph.

Most Sunderlands in Great Britain were assigned to RAF Coastal Command general reconnaissance squadrons, conducting patrol and antisubmarine missions. Various marks had different armament, but all included at least bow and tail turrets a dorsal turret also was added. On rare occasions when aerial opposition was encountered, the seemingly ungainly Sunderland could protect itself against enemy twin-engine aircraft.

Prior to D-Day, Sunderlands covered the Bay of Biscay on a daily basis, suppressing U-boats and tracking coastal convoys. It was tedious, unglamorous work but an important part of the Allied effort.

The Sunderland remained in production until war’s end, by which time 739 had been delivered, and it was kept in service until 1958.

Supermarine Spitfire

No single aircraft has so captured the world’s imagination as the Royal Air Force’s sleekly elegant Spitfire. Tracing its ancestry to a successful line of racers, the Spitfire was designed by Supermarine’s chief engineer, Reginald J. Mitchell, who had produced the Schneider Trophy champions of the 1930s. First flown in March 1936, the prototype was powered by the Rolls-Royce Merlin, a liquid-cooled V-12 of one thousand horsepower.

Production Spitfires were delivered in June 1938, and they equipped eleven RAF squadrons when war broke out in September 1939. Over the next year their strength increased nineteen squadrons were available at the start of the Battle of Britain. The 199 Spitfire Ia models constituted not quite one-third of the RAF’s frontline fighter strength.

By 1944 the most significant types were the Mark IX fighter and the Mark XI, a high-altitude photo-reconnaissance platform. ‘‘PR’’ Spitfires were flown by U.S. Army Air Forces units as well. The Mark IX featured a Merlin 60 engine, two 20 mm cannon, and four .303 caliber machine guns its top speed was 400 mph at twenty thousand feet. Though considered an interim ‘‘anti Focke-Wulf ’’ design, the Mark IX proved itself versatile and long-lived, accounting for one-quarter of total production of the type.

One unusual aspect of the Spitfire’s career involved training U.S. Navy pilots to fly the British fighter. Realizing that naval gunfire spotting would be an important part of Overlord, cruiser-based aviators were qualified in Spitfires on the theory that it was easier to transition a trained spotter to fighters than to train a fighter pilot in gunfire support. Because the spotters had to fly over hostile territory, the Curtiss SOC biplanes ordinarily used would have been highly vulnerable to German flak.

During the Normandy campaign nearly half of all RAF fighters were Spitfires, which roamed almost at will over northern France, attacking German transport and lines of communications. Despite its potentially vulnerable liquid-cooled engine, the Spitfire was well suited as a tactical support aircraft owing to its speed, armament, and dive-bombing capability. Some 365 Spitfires were shot down from June through August, with nearly three hundred written off—41 percent of the nearly two thousand available.

Later in the war, more powerful Griffin engines were mated to the Spitfire airframe, resulting in even better performance. Additionally, both modified and specially built Supermarines were flown off British aircraft carriers as Seafires, bringing a degree of fighter performance previously unknown to the Royal Navy.

Total Spitfire and Seafire production reached twenty-two thousand units, in at least forty marks.

Westland Lysander

The gull-wing Lysander established a notable record on RAF special operations during World War II. Originally received as Army Co-Operation Command’s first monoplane in 1938, it was powered by a Bristol Mercury or Perseus radial engine of 870 to 905 horsepower. Top speed was rated at 219 miles per hour. Its two-man crew comprised a pilot and observergunner, with room for a passenger in the middle cockpit.

The Lysander was designed to land in confined spaces, affording liaison between army units or the army and air force. With aerodynamically activated slats and flaps, it could be flown down to airspeeds as slow as 65 mph. Though the seemingly ungainly machine carried three machine guns and could drop small bombs, it was seldom used offensively. It was more often employed in liaison and tactical reconnaissance missions as well as target towing and air-sea rescue.

In support of D-Day, Lysanders were often the machine of choice in delivering British, French, and other Allied intelligence operatives and agents into Occupied Europe. Lysanders succored resistance forces as well.

Total production was 1,425 aircraft.

Army Air Corps and Operation Torch

Until late 1942 much of northwestern Africa (Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco) was under control of the Vichy French government, totaling 125,000 soldiers in the territories, along with 210 tanks, 500 aircraft, and coastal artillery. Victory would mean clearing Axis powers from North Africa, reducing German pressure on Russia and improving Allied naval control of the Mediterranean Sea. The British-American invasion plans of French North Africa was known as Operation Torch.

Operation Torch landed on the shores of French Morocco on November 8, 1942, with Ranger (CV-4), Suwanee (ACV-27), Sangamon (ACV26), and Santee (ACV-29) supporting U.S. forces north and south of Casablanca. In all, the four flattops embarked 109 Grumman F4F-4 fighters with sixty-two Douglas SBD-3 and Grumman TBF-1 bombers. Operation Torch was assembled and launched so quickly that many pilots had little opportunity for training. Some had not flown in two weeks—an inordinately long layoff for carrier aviators.

The Casablanca landings were opposed by Vichy French forces allied with Germany. The defenders counted about two hundred aircraft, including American-built Curtiss fighters and Martin bombers.

Things began poorly. On November 8 a flight of seven Santee Wildcats got lost and ran low on fuel. One ditched and five crashlanded ashore with one pilot lost. Ranger’s Fighting Squadron Four lost six planes on its first mission, though Sangamon F4Fs claimed four shootdowns without loss. Later that day eighteen Ranger SBDs attacked harbor facilities including the thirty-five thousand-ton battleship Jean Bart, whose fifteen-inch guns posed a threat to Allied ships. She was partly sunk at her mooring while a submarine was destroyed.

When a French surface force steamed out to engage the U.S. warships, Dauntlesses and Wildcats descended to bomb and strafe. A light cruiser and two destroyers were damaged enough to be run aground to prevent their sinking.

On November 9, Ranger SBDs were back over Casablanca Harbor where Vichy antiaircraft batteries still posed a threat. Dauntlesses hit Jean Bart again, knocking out her remaining AA mounts. Meanwhile, Curtiss P-40s took off from Chenango (ACV-28), flying ashore to newly captured airfields. It was a precursor of other joint ArmyNavy operations throughout the war.

Operation Torch provided a laboratory for carrier aviators to perfect their trade. They flew support missions for ground troops, sank a Vichy submarine at sea, and engaged in air combat. Some of their opponents were combat veterans of the 1939–40 campaign. A Ranger pilot, Lieutenant (jg) Charles A. Shields, bailed out of his riddled F4F, and a Frenchman flying a Hawk buzzed him as he parachuted to earth, “wagging his wingtips and waving and laughing like hell.” Still, the tailhook fighters downed twenty-five Vichymen against five Wildcats lost in dogfights.

Losses were stiff, however, amounting to nearly 25 percent by the time the fighting ended on November 10. Ground fire and operational losses were by far the greatest causes, forcing planners to allot more aircraft to future operations.

Army Air Corps: The Final Aerial Combat Mission of WW2

The P-51s’ mission that day started out well.

Cruising above the Pacific under the morning sun, the Americans had approached the Japanese coastline without incident. Jerry wondered how many more missions like this he would have to fly. They’d all thought the war was over, but now, here he was again, heading to strike a stubbornly resistant enemy.

But down below, in the nation they were about to attack, a philosophical battle was raging on whether to surrender or fight on. The “Big Six”—the six military officers running Japan—had been split by a vote of 3-3 on when and how to end the war with honor. In general, hard, passionate divisions of opinion existed among the Japanese military: some of the older officers wanted to surrender to prevent the destruction of Japan, while others wanted to fight on to the death and kill as many Americans as possible.

The previous night, while another 300 American B-29s strafed Japan again, a group of rogue Japanese officers had started a coup against Prime Minister Suzuki and Emperor Hirohito. The officers burned the prime minister’s office and surrounded the Imperial Palace, hoping to kidnap the emperor, all in an effort to prevent Japan’s leadership from thinking about surrendering. For these officers, and for so many of the Japanese people, surrender was not an option. There was glory in death, but only shame in surrender Japan, for its part, had never been invaded or lost a war in its history.

Fortunately for the rest of the world, the coup did not succeed. A group of senior Japanese officers talked the insurgents off the ledge, convincing them that there was nowhere to go. Bu while the revolt ended, the war did not, and so, with the shoreline of the enemy territory coming into view and Phil Schlamberg, his dear friend and fellow pilot, on his wing, Jerry knew it was time to go back to work.

On Jerry’s order, al the planes in his squadron dropped their external fuel tanks over the ocean, then started their familiar aerial trek over the great, snow-capped peak of Mount Fuji. As of yet, there had been no radio signal with the word “UTAH,” signaling the end of the war.

As the Americans approached the Japanese capital, they began to identify targets. Within minutes, they swooped down over airfields and attacked despite heavy ground fire. Tracer bullets flew up from the Japanese guns as the Severity-Eighth made multiple passes at each target. Phil stayed tight on Jerry’s wing, just as instructed.

After strafing the last airfield, Jerry checked his fuel gauge and saw he was still in good shape. But when one of the pilots radioed that his tank had reached the ninety-gallon mark—the amount a Mustang needed for the return flight—it was time to pull up and begin plotting the course back to Iwo Jima.

Jerry looked over at Phil, who was still on his wing, and give him a thumbs up.

Phil looked back and returned the gesture.

Confidence. Maybe it was working.

With the battle of Tokyo complete, Jerry set his course back out to the ocean and banked to the south. The three other Mustangs in Jerry’s squadron returned with him. A few moments later, as they approached the coast where they would rendezvous with the navigational B-29s, they neared a cloud cover in front of them, often the case when approaching the atmospheric temperature inversions near the coast. With Phil still tight on his wing, Jerry led the four Mustangs into the cloud bank. Flying at an altitude of about 7,000 feet, Jerry focused his eyes on his navigation instruments, as the interior of the white, puffy clouds blocking his view of everything else.

But when the Mustangs emerged on the other side of the clouds, a devastating reality soon surfaced. Phil was gone. Most likely, he had been brought down by antiaircraft bullets fired into the clouds. There was no sign of him.

Jerry was devastated. When he landed at Iwo Jima, meanwhile, he learned something else: the war was over. The emperor had announced Japan’s surrender three hours earlier, while Jerry and his flight were still over Japan. The code word UTAH had been broadcast to U.S. aircraft over the country, but the word had not reached the planes of the Seventy-Eighth until they landed.

It was a surreal feeling as Jerry climbed out of his plane and jumped down to the airfield, standing on a once-bloody Pacific island. Now, suddenly, it was a world at peace. The men of the Seventy-Eighth had a saying, “Alive in 󈧱.” That had been their goal, and now it was their reality. They were going home, alive.

As Jerry walked away from his plane, another realization hit him: he had just flown the final combat mission of the war, and Phil was the final combat death of the great war. One day, after Jerry had time to collect his emotions and his thoughts, the great historical significance of the mission he’d just flown would sink in. But for now, one thought consumed his mind.


Contents

The Albacore prototypes were built to meet Specification S.41/36 for a three-seat TSR (torpedo/spotter/reconnaissance) for the FAA to replace the Swordfish. The Albacore was designated TBR (torpedo/bomber/reconnaissance) and unlike the Swordfish, was fully capable of dive bombing: "The Albacore was designed for diving at speeds up to 215 knots(400 km/h) lAS with flaps either up or down, and it was certainly steady in a dive, recovery being easy and smooth. " [ 1 ] and the maximum under wing bomb load was 4 x 500 lb bombs. [ 2 ] The Albacore had a more powerful engine than the Swordfish and was more aerodynamically refined. It offered the crew an enclosed and heated cockpit. The Albacore also had features such as an automatic liferaft ejection system which triggered in the event of the aircraft ditching. [ 3 ]

The first of two prototypes flew on 12 December 1938 [ 4 ] and production of the first batch of 98 aircraft began in 1939. Early Albacores were fitted with the Bristol Taurus II engine and those built later received the more powerful Taurus XII. Boscombe Down testing of the Albacore and Taurus II engine, in February 1940, showed a maximum speed of 160 mph (258 km/h), at an altitude of 4,800 ft (1,463 m), at 11,570 lb (5,259 kg), which was achieved with four under-wing depth charges, while maximum speed without the depth charges was 172 mph (277 km/h). [ 5 ] An Albacore fitted with the Taurus II engine and carrying a torpedo weighed 11,100 lb (5,045 kg). [ 6 ]

A total of 800 Albacores were built. [ 7 ] [ 8 ]


NavWeaps Forums

Sep 04, 2007 #31 2007-09-04T21:06

Sep 04, 2007 #32 2007-09-04T21:07

Sep 05, 2007 #33 2007-09-05T01:34

I was not claiming your 18 number was false. But what you did not say earlier, is that there were indeed 45 a/c on that carrier. What were the others?

I do not agree with the doctrine that there is the luxury of deciding that we want to maximize strike over escort/defense, or the reverse. And then change the composition of a/c. A balanced air group (to use a future FAA term) was the only sensible thing to do in the face of potential air attack. Chasing down historical evidence of whether a carrier was around when a given ship was sunk is nice to know, but irrelevant for assessing decision making at the time.

Sep 05, 2007 #34 2007-09-05T01:40

jlyons97 wrote: Ok, then. Clarification.

I was not claiming your 18 number was false. But what you did not say earlier, is that there were indeed 45 a/c on that carrier. What were the others?

As I've stated above, in summer 1942, Illustrious carried 21 Martlet, 6 Fulmars, and 18 Swordfish. Also, in February 1943 Indomitable 40 Seafires and 15 Albacores. These carriers generally carried a fighter-heavy airgroup.

Sep 05, 2007 #35 2007-09-05T14:39

That's a balanced air group.

BUT, and again, my original point was the state of the FAA afloat on carriers during the spring of 1940. Lend-lease a/c did not come on line until 1942, and then only Marlets at first. The Med in 1940/41 was not the same environment for the FAA as it would be a year (or two) later.

The FAA demonstrably during this period was short of fighters afloat, and the shortage hurt.

Sep 05, 2007 #36 2007-09-05T15:38

Per http://www.fleetairarmarchive.net/Ships the FAA during this period 1940/41 did deploy a lot of TSRs, but the fighter element was usually still there, pre-lend lease. For example, from 1940 to 1941 Ark Royal deployed 30 Fairey Swordfish, 12 Blackburn Skuas, 12 Fairey Fulmars (that's 24 fighters, well, including crap dual-purpose Skua fighters). However, when Ark sank, she was carrying only Swordfish and Albacores. Courageous carried only TSR when sank.

Furious was better balanced pre-lend lease, again with Skuas in the fighter role. Air Wings Sept 1939 - 9 Blackburn Skua, 18 Fairey Swordfish May 1940 - 6 Sea Gladiator, 18 Fairey Sworsfish June 1940 - 9 Fairey Fulmar, 6 Blackburn Skua, 9 Fairey Swordfish July 1940 - 9 Blackburn Skua, 18 Fairey Swordfish April 1941 - 12 Blackburn Skua May 1941 - 3 Fairey Fulmar June 1941 - 9 Fairey Fulmar, 4 Hawker Sea Hurricanes, 9 Fairey Albacore and 18 Fairey Swordfish.

However, you're right, in that more fighters should have been embarked. For example, when Furious was in the Med in 1942, she had 13 fighters (Fulmars and Hurricanes) and 27 TSRs, whereas a better mix might have been 15 TSRs and 25 Hurricanes.


Fairey Albacores in the Middle East (2 of 3) - History

Was really after the boats, but the sunrays were a bonus

El atún blanco, bonito del norte, albacora o en Canarias barrilote es una especie de atún que se encuentra en todas las aguas tropicales y en los océanos templados, y en el mar Mediterráneo.

Albacore tuna, bonito from the north, albacore or in the Canary Islands barrilote is a species of tuna that is found in all tropical waters and in temperate oceans, and in the Mediterranean Sea.

M/S Albacore and M/S Krossøy at Fosnavåg Notbøteri

I'd like to be here right now, eating Bowpicker's Albacore Tuna fish & chips for lunch.

Montenegro is a country in Eastern Europe bordering Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, Albania and the Adriatic Sea. It used to be a part of Yugoslavia. The capital is Podgorica. The name Montenegro is Italian and means Black mountain. Montenegro was an independent princedom between 1878 and 1910 and an independent kingdom until 1918. That year Montenegro became part of Yugoslavia. In 2003 Yugoslavia was transformed into the new country of Serbia and Montenegro, but this fell apart in 2006 when both countries went their separate ways. Montenegro is therefore the youngest country in Europe. Montenegro is not a member of the European Union, but it is a member of NATO. Despite the fact that Montenegro is not yet an EU Member State, people do pay with the euro. Montenegro may be small, but this beautiful nation has a huge array of natural and man-made wonders. Once overlooked in favor of more famous Mediterranean countries, Montenegro is quickly gaining a reputation as a great place to travel. It's easy to see why. The mountainous hinterland is home to deep gorges, flowing rivers, glacial lakes and old-growth forests, popular for adventure activities. The winding coast runs along pretty blonde bays overlooking the royal blue Adriatic Sea, ancient Venetian villages and UNESCO-walled towns. Dobrota is basically a residential area of ​​Kotor, starting north of Kotor Old Town and extending for 5 km along the coastline. Despite its proximity to its famous neighbor, it retains a characteristic feel.

Fisheries in Montenegro have a long tradition. Almost all the fishing activities take place within the national territorial waters. The major fishing port in Montenegro is Bar, and there are smaller port at Kotor, Herceg Novi, Budva and Tivat. Marine fisheries are divided into large-scale and small-scale fisheries. Majority of the sector is consisted of small fishing vessels. For fish and seafood lovers, Montenegro is a real paradise! The sea depths of the Adriatic Sea are rich in a wide variety of seafood delicacies: a special type of tuna or albacore, dorado or flounder, deep-sea eel or small but popular red mullet. And every morning, fishermen deliver their catch to the stalls of fish markets, shops and restaurants.

Montenegro is een land in Oost-Europa en grenst aan Bosnië en Herzegovina, Servië, Kosovo, Albanië en de Adriatische Zee. Vroeger was het een deel van Joegoslavië. De hoofdstad is Podgorica. De naam Montenegro is Italiaans en betekent Zwarte berg. Montenegro was tussen 1878 en 1910 een zelfstandig prinsdom en tot 1918 een zelfstandig koninkrijk. Dat jaar werd Montenegro onderdeel van Joegoslavië. In 2003 werd Joegoslavië omgevormd in het nieuwe land Servië en Montenegro, maar dit viel in 2006 uit elkaar toen beide landen een eigen weg gingen. Montenegro is misschien klein, maar deze prachtige natie heeft een enorm scala aan natuurlijke en door de mens gemaakte wonderen. Ooit over het hoofd gezien ten gunste van meer bekende mediterrane landen, krijgt Montenegro snel een reputatie als een geweldige plek om te reizen. Het is gemakkelijk te zien waarom. Het bergachtige achterland herbergt diepe kloven, stromende rivieren, gletsjermeren en oerbossen, populair voor avontuurlijke activiteiten. De kronkelige kust loopt langs mooie blonde baaien met uitzicht op de koningsblauwe Adriatische Zee, antieke Venetiaanse dorpjes en door UNESCO ommuurde steden. Visserij in Montenegro heeft een lange traditie. Bijna al de vis activiteiten vinden plaats binnen de nationale territoriale wateren. De belangrijkste vissershaven in Montenegro is Bar, en er zijn kleinere havens in Kotor, Herceg Novi, Budva en Tivat. De zeevisserij is onderverdeeld in grootschalige en kleinschalige visserij. De meerderheid van de sector bestaat uit kleine vissersvaartuigen. Voor liefhebbers van vis en zeevruchten is Montenegro een echt paradijs! De diepten van de Adriatische Zee zijn rijk aan een breed scala aan delicatessen van zeevruchten: een speciaal soort tonijn of witte tonijn, dorado of bot, diepzeepaling of kleine maar populaire rode mul. En elke ochtend leveren vissers hun vangst af aan de kramen van vismarkten, winkels en restaurants.


Contents

The Albacore prototypes were built to meet Specification S.41/36 for a three-seat TSR (torpedo/spotter/reconnaissance) for the FAA to replace the Swordfish. Fairey Albacore_sentence_4

The Albacore was designated TBR (torpedo/bomber/reconnaissance) and like the Swordfish, was capable of dive bombing: Fairey Albacore_sentence_5

and the maximum under wing bomb load was four 500 lb (230 kg) bombs. Fairey Albacore_sentence_6

The Albacore had a constant speed propeller, a more powerful engine than the Swordfish and was more aerodynamically refined. Fairey Albacore_sentence_7

It offered the crew an enclosed and heated cockpit and had an automatic liferaft ejection system that triggered in the event of the aircraft ditching. Fairey Albacore_sentence_8

The first of two prototypes flew on 12 December 1938 and production of the first batch of 98 aircraft began in 1939. Fairey Albacore_sentence_9

Early Albacores were fitted with the Bristol Taurus II engine and those built later received the more powerful Taurus XII. Fairey Albacore_sentence_10

Boscombe Down testing of the Albacore and Taurus II engine, in February 1940, showed a maximum speed of 160 mph (258 km/h), at an altitude of 4,800 ft (1,463 m), at 11,570 lb (5,259 kg), which was achieved with four under-wing depth charges, while maximum speed without the depth charges was 172 mph (277 km/h). Fairey Albacore_sentence_11

An Albacore fitted with the Taurus II engine and carrying a torpedo weighed 11,100 lb (5,045 kg). Fairey Albacore_sentence_12

A total of 800 Albacores were built, including two prototypes which were all built at Fairey's Hayes Factory and test flown at London's Great West Aerodrome, what is now London Heathrow Airport. Fairey Albacore_sentence_13


Immunization with inactivated Middle East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus vaccine leads to lung immunopathology on challenge with live virus

To determine if a hypersensitive-type lung pathology might occur when mice were given an inactivated MERS-CoV vaccine and challenged with infectious virus as was seen with SARS-CoV vaccines, we prepared and vaccinated mice with an inactivated MERS-CoV vaccine. Neutralizing antibody was induced by vaccine with and without adjuvant and lung virus was reduced in vaccinated mice after challenge. Lung mononuclear infiltrates occurred in all groups after virus challenge but with increased infiltrates that contained eosinophils and increases in the eosinophil promoting IL-5 and IL-13 cytokines only in the vaccine groups. Inactivated MERS-CoV vaccine appears to carry a hypersensitive-type lung pathology risk from MERS-CoV infection that is similar to that found with inactivated SARS-CoV vaccines from SARS-CoV infection.

Keywords: coronavirus Eosinophils immunopathology Middle East Respiratory Syndrome vaccination.

Figures

Mean serum-neutralizing antibody titers to…

Mean serum-neutralizing antibody titers to MERS-CoV of vaccinated mice 3 weeks after the…

Mean viral titers of MERS-CoV…

Mean viral titers of MERS-CoV on days 3 and 6 after intranasal challenge…

Representative photomicrographs of lung tissue…

Representative photomicrographs of lung tissue 3 days after challenge of previously vaccinated mice…

Mean lung cytokine levels on…

Mean lung cytokine levels on day 3 after challenge of vaccinated mice with…