Information

Bush and Gorbachev Declare End of Cold War


President George H. At a joint press conference aboard the Soviet passenger liner Maxim Gorky in Marsaxlokk Harbor, President Bush speaks about his hopes for a cooperative U.S.-Soviet relationship.


This Day In Market History: Bush, Gorbachev Suggest An End To The Cold War

On Dec. 3, 1989, President George H. W. Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev indicated that their rival nations may be wrapping up the Cold War.

Where The Market Was

The S&P 500 traded around $350, and the Dow Jones Industrial Average traded near $2,750.

What Else Was Going On In The World

East Germany had just written protection for communist monopoly out of its constitution, and the U.S. was about to intervene in a military coup in the Philippines.

Bush And Gorbachev Pursue Peace

After a series of talks, the U.S. and Soviet leaders left the Malta Summit with expressed optimism that the Cold War was coming to a close. The nations agreed in 1990 to work toward an arms and nuclear weapon treaty and scheduled another summit for June of that year.

While some scholars consider 1991 the official end of the war, others interpreted the Malta statements as declarations of peace and subsequently declared the war over.

“The characteristics of the Cold War should be abandoned,” Gorbachev said at the time. “[. ] The arms race, mistrust, psychological and ideological struggle, all those should be things of the past.”

The nations have had a difficult time honoring Gorbachev’s vision. Mistrust and psychological and ideological struggles are typical to U.S.-Russia relations.

Former US President George HW Bush Dies At 94

This Day In Market History: DARPA Is Formed To Fight The Cold War


Bush and Gorbachev Declare End of Cold War - HISTORY

Consumer goods - goods bought and used by consumers, rather than by manufacturers for producing other goods.

Mass communication - the imparting or exchanging of information on a large scale to a wide range of people.

The Reason for Change

As the Cold War continued, the capitalist system of America and the West substantially out-performed the economies of communist nations.

The US could afford superior military technology and deploy those weapons and well-trained soldiers at strategic locations around the world. Meantime, the Soviet Union -- whose communist economic system didn't work -- was falling farther and farther behind. The Soviet side could produce neither cutting-edge weapons nor consumer goods and were suffering through major shortages of goods with long lines and coupons to buy things.

With mass communication improving, more and more residents of the communist nations realized their system was failing. This was particularly visible in some of the Soviet Union's communist allies and Warsaw Pact military allies, such as Poland. With this growing knowledge, countries began to demand change in access to information and economic improvements.

President Mikhail Gorbachev assumed the reins of power in the Soviet Union in 1985, no one predicted the revolution he would bring. Gorbachev introduced the policies of glasnost and perestroika to the USSR.

GLASNOST , or openness, meant a greater willingness on the part of Soviet officials to allow western ideas and goods into the USSR. PERESTROIKA, or restructuring, was an initiative that allowed some competition in the communist economies. Gorbachev hoped these changes would be enough to spark the sluggish Soviet economy. Freedom, however, is addictive.

Understanding Questions

1. Explain why people in the soviet bloc began to demand change

2. What change did president Gorbachev introduce?

The unravelling of the Soviet bloc began in Poland in June 1989 with strikes organised by a government opposition group called ‘Solidarity’. The USSR agreed to give Poland democratic elections. Despite previous Soviet military interventions in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland itself, Polish voters elected a non-communist opposition government who won 99% of the seats. The world watched with anxious eyes, expecting Soviet tanks to roll into Poland preventing the new government from taking power. Gorbachev, however, refused to act.

Like dominoes, Eastern European communist dictatorships fell one by one. By the fall of 1989, East and West Germans were tearing down the Berlin Wall with pickaxes. Communist regimes were ousted in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

Demands for freedom soon spread to the Soviet Union. In December 1991, Ukraine, Belorussia, and Russia itself declared independence and the Soviet Union was dissolved. Gorbachev was a president without a country.

Americans were pleasantly shocked at the turn of events in the Soviet bloc. Republicans were quick to claim credit for winning the Cold War. They believed the military spending policies of the Reagan-Bush years forced the Soviets to the brink of economic collapse as they attempted to keep up. Democrats argued that containment of communism was a bipartisan policy for 45 years begun by the Democrat Harry Truman.

Others pointed out that no one really won the Cold War. The United States spent trillions of dollars arming themselves for a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union that fortunately never came. Regardless, thousands of American lives were lost waging proxy wars in Korea and Vietnam.

Understanding Questions

3. What happened to end communism in Soviet bloc nations?

4. What fears existed on how the Soviet government would respond to this?

5. How did Republicans and Democrats both claim credit for the end of the Cold War?


George H.W. Bush's Presidency Saw End of Cold War

This is Mary Tillotson. And this is Steve Ember with THE MAKING OF A NATION -- a VOA Special English program about the history of the United States. Today, we continue telling about the administration of President George Herbert Walker Bush. He was elected the forty-first president of the United States in 1988.

The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union ended under the administration of President George Bush. This very tense period had lasted more than forty years. The invention of weapons that could kill millions of people at one time increased worldwide fears during this period.

The world was changing greatly however, during the late 1980s. The Soviet Union was dying.

On November ninth, 1989, East Germany opened the Berlin Wall for the first time since it had been built. This wall had divided Communist East Germany from the West since 1961. Citizens and soldiers soon began tearing it down. The fall of the Berlin Wall ended much of the fear and tension between democratic nations and the Soviet Union.

Tensions continued to ease as Communist rule in most of the former Soviet countries ended by the early 1990s.

Fifteen republics had belonged to the Soviet Union. By the end of 1991, most had declared their independence. President Bush recognized all the former Soviet republics. They became a very loosely formed coalition called the Commonwealth of Independent States. Countries that had considered the United States the enemy, now looked to it to lead the way to peace.

As the Soviet Union was dying, President Bush repeatedly negotiated with Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev. In the spring of 1990, for example, their meeting in the United States resulted in an important agreement. It called for each side to destroy most of its chemical weapons. The two men also agreed to improve trade and economic relations.

The American and Soviet presidents met in July, 1991, in Moscow. There, the two leaders signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, called START ONE. This treaty called for both the Soviet Union and the United States to reduce their supply of long-range nuclear bombs and missiles. Each promised to decrease its supply by about one-third over seven years. START ONE became the first agreement between the two powers that ordered cuts in supplies of existing nuclear weapons.

In September 1991, President Bush said the United States would remove most of its short-range nuclear weapons from service. He also said the United States would destroy many of these weapons. The next month, the Soviet nations announced the same actions.

On December twenty-fifth, Mikhail Gorbachev officially resigned as Soviet president. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ended.

As president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin became the most important leader of the former Soviet Republics. President Bush and President Yeltsin signed another arms treaty in January, 1993. This START TWO agreement provided for reducing long-range nuclear weapons to half the number planned for START ONE. Cuts were to be made over seven years.

George Bush ordered American forces into battle two times during his administration. These conflicts were not linked to disputes with Communist governments.

In December 1989, he sent troops to Panama. The goal was to oust the dictator, General Manuel Antonio Noriega. Noriega had refused to honor election results that showed another candidate had been elected president of Panama. The United States also wanted Noriega on illegal drug charges. In addition, President Bush said he sent troops in to protect thirty five-thousand Americans living in the Central American nation.

American soldiers easily defeated Noriega’s forces. He was taken to the United States for trial. The United States then supported the presidency of Guillermo Endara, who had officially won the presidential election in Panama.

In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. The United States and other nations were receiving much of their oil from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The United Nations declared a resolution clearly threatening war on Iraq unless it withdrew from Kuwait by January fifteenth, 1991. But Iraq failed to obey.

President Bush succeeded in forming a coalition with thirty-eight other countries against Iraq. The coalition wanted to free Kuwait and protect Saudi Arabia from invasion by Iraq. President Bush sent hundreds of thousands of American troops into the effort.

The Persian Gulf War began in Iraq on January seventeenth, 1991. At first, the coalition bombed Iraqi targets in Iraq and Kuwait. The bombing destroyed or damaged many important centers. On February twenty-sixth, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein ordered his troops to leave Kuwait.

The order came too late. The Iraqis were surrounded. Major ground attacks on Iraq and Kuwait defeated Saddam Hussein’s forces in a little more than four days.

Only about three hundred-seventy coalition troops died in the Persian Gulf War. Some military experts say as many as one hundred-thousand Iraqi fighters may have been killed in the fighting. Others say far fewer Iraqi soldiers died. However, thousands of civilians were thought to have died in Iraq and Kuwait. Kuwait suffered severe damage. But it was free.

After the war Saddam Hussein still controlled his country. Years later, some Americans continued to criticize the Bush Administration for not trying to oust the Iraqi leader. They believed President Bush should have urged that coalition forces try to capture the Iraqi capital, Baghdad.

After the war ended, Kurdish people in northern Iraq fought to oust the Iraqi leader. So did Shi-ite Muslims in southern Iraq. These groups suffered crushing defeat.

The defeated Kurds fled to Iran, Turkey, and the northern Iraqi mountains. Thousands of Kurds died or suffered from war injuries, disease, and starvation. In April, President Bush ordered American troops to work with other coalition nations to give humanitarian aid to the refugees. The troops established refugee camps for the Kurds.

As time passed, Iraqi soldiers and aircraft continued to attack Kurds in the north and Shi-ite Muslims in the south. Coalition forces led by the United States established safety areas in northern and southern Iraq. Years later, these “no fly” areas still restricted Iraqi military air activity.

President Bush also ordered American military troops to join other troops in Somalia. By late 1992, lack of rain and continuing civil war had caused widespread suffering there. Opposing armed ethnic groups were keeping Somalis from receiving food and other aid supplies. American soldiers helped in the effort to get aid to the starving people.

The North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA, was signed in late 1992. It called for the United States and Mexico to remove taxes and other trade barriers. Mexico and Canada agreed to take similar action. NAFTA became effective in 1994, after George Bush had left office.

Some people feared that NAFTA would hurt millions of workers. Others praised President Bush for supporting the agreement.

By the third year of his four-year term, President Bush’s international activities had made him an extremely popular president. It seemed he would be easily re-elected in 1992.

Historians often say, however, that political situations can change quickly. That is what happened to America’s forty-first president. Economic problems and other issues inside the United States began to seriously damage the great popularity of George Herbert Walker Bush.

This program of THE MAKING OF A NATION was written by Jerilyn Watson and produced by George Grow. This is Mary Tillotson. And this is Steve Ember. Join us again next week for another VOA Special English program about the history of the United States.


Masterpieces of History : The Peaceful End of the Cold War in Eastern Europe, 1989

"With some irony, the way the USSR separated itself from its empire and its own peaceful end may seem to be its most beneficial contributions to history. These episodes are, in any case, masterpieces of history."-Jacques Levesque, The Enigma of 1989

"When, where, why did the Cold War end? How did it manage to end peacefully? The answers are in this wonderful collection of crucial historical documents, penetrating essays by experts, plus the record of a revealing symposium including former Soviet and American officials. An invaluable source book on the end of the 20th century."-William C. Taubman, Amherst College, Pulitzer Prize-winning author of Khrushchev• The Man and His Era

"Evocative, illuminating, insightful: This volume is a brilliant collection of documents, conversations, and essays. It is absolutely indispensable for understanding the end of the Cold War."-Melvyn Leffler, University of Virginia, G.L. Beer Prize-winning author of For the Soul of Mankind

"The National Security Archive . deserves the highest praise for its dedication to work and truth, and for overcoming numerous obstacles created by bureaucrats and other excessively cowardly and greedy custodians of the truth about the past." (From the Foreword)-Anatoly S. Chernyaev, adviser to Mikhail Gorbachev, author of My Six Years with Gorbachev

"The conference held at . Musgrove [included in this volume]. illuminated one of the most important periods in 20th century history . The National Security Archive [has] rendered a service to historians and the public as a whole." (From the Foreword)-Jack F. Matlock Jr., Former U.S. Ambassador, author of Autopsy on an Empire

Svetlana Savranskaya is Director of Russia/Eurasia Programs at the National Security Archive.


On This Day: Bush, Gorbachev announce end to Cold War

Dec. 3 (UPI) -- On this date in history:

In 1818, Illinois was admitted as the 21st state in the United States.

In 1833, Oberlin College in Ohio, the first truly coeducational college in the United States, opened with an enrollment of 29 men and 15 women.

In 1929, the Ford Motor Co. raised the pay of its employees from $6 to $7 a day despite the collapse of the U.S. stock market.

In 1967, Dr. Christiaan Barnard performed the first successful heart transplant at Cape Town, South Africa.

In 1984, poison gas leaked at a Union Carbide pesticide factory in Bhopal, India, in the world's worst chemical disaster. Death toll estimates varied widely. Government officials said about 3,000 people died shortly after the leak and many thousands more in the months and years ahead.

In 1989, U.S. President George H.W. Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev declared the Cold War over during a summit in Malta. Some historians believe the Cold War didn't end until 1991, though, when the Soviet Union collapsed.

In 1992, the U.N. Security Council voted unanimously to authorize sending a U.S.-led multinational force to Somalia.

In 1997, delegates from 131 countries met in Canada to sign the Convention on the Prohibition, Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines.

In 2006, Hugo Chavez, an outspoken critic of U.S. President George W. Bush and U.S. foreign policy, was re-elected for a third term as president of Venezuela.

In 2009, Comcast, the largest cable operator in the United States, bought 51 percent of NBC Universal from General Electric for $13.75 billion.

In 2015, Defense Secretary Ashton Carter announced all combat roles in the U.S. armed forces would be opened to women.

In 2017, astronauts on the International Space Station held the first pizza party in space.

When you really, really miss pizza. you CASUALLY mention it to the International @Space_Station ​ Boss during a live public event


Bush and Gorbachev Declare End of Cold War - HISTORY

The standoff over Russian nuclear missiles installed in Cuba, at the doorstep of the U.S., marked the coldest period of USSR-American relations in the Cold War. A gradual thawing began thereafter. A landmark arms reduction treaty (Salt II) was agreed to in 1979, and another one (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty) was agreed upon eight years after, as the Soviet Union began to gradually lose clout. Rather than suppress dissent, Mikhail Gorbachev began to answer some of their calls, and make overtures to Washington for a meeting.

On this day, November 3, in 1989. mere weeks after the “fall” of the Berlin Wall, newly-elected President George H.W. Bush met Gorbachev in Malta, where the two jointly announced the Cold War was at an end.

Whether that was true or changed anything in practice is debatable. While Gorbachev announced from Matla “The world is leaving one epoch and entering another. We are at the beginning of a long road to a lasting, peaceful era,” little was agreed to at the meeting itself. The two leaders met again the following year, and came to a series of agreements further demilitarizing Europe, but this would be Gorbachev’s last hurrah: he was forced out of office in December of 1991.


Reagan, Bush, Gorbachev : Revisiting the End of the Cold War

This work is a contemporary chronicle of the Cold War and offers an analysis of policy and rhetoric of the United States and Soviet Union during the 1980s. The authors examine the assumptions that drove political decisions and the rhetoric that defined the relationship as the Soviet Union began to implode.

This work demonstrates that while the subsequent unraveling of the Soviet empire was an unintended side effect of Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms, termination of the Cold War was not. Ronald Reagan deserves full credit for recognizing Gorbachev's sincerity and his determination to change the direction of Soviet policies. For this, Reagan felt the full wrath of anticommunist hawks for doing business with a communist leader. But it was Gorbachev who concluded the superpowers had become mesmerized by ideological myths which ruled out any meaningful discussions of a possible accommodation of political issues for more than four decades. The evidence is compelling that Gorbachev himself broke the Cold War's ideological straight jacket that had paralyzed Moscow and Washington's ability to resolve their differences. Though politically weakened, Gorbachev conceded nothing to U.S. military superiority. Never did he negotiate from a position of weakness. In doing so, the last Soviet leader faced even greater political and physical risk. Without Gorbachev the end of the Cold War could have played out very differently and perhaps with great danger.

Отзывы - Написать отзыв

Избранные страницы

Содержание

Другие издания - Просмотреть все

Часто встречающиеся слова и выражения

Об авторе (2008)

Norman A. Graebner is Randolph P. Compton Professor of History and Public Affairs Emeritus, the University of Virginia and is the recipient of the university's highest honor, the Thomas Jefferson Award. He is an internationally acknowledged authority on United States and American diplomacy. He was a Harold Vyvyan Harmsworth Professor of American History at Oxford University and a Thomas Jefferson Visiting Scholar at Downing College, Cambridge. He is the author, co-author, or editor of more than thirty books and some 130 articles, essays, and book chapters, including Empire on the Pacific: A Study in American Continental Expansion (1955, 1983), Foundations of American Foreign Policy: A Realist Appraisal from Franklin to McKinley (1985), and America as a World Power: A Realist Appraisal from Wilson to Reagan (1984).

Richard Dean Burns is Professor Emeritus and former chair of the History Department at California State University, Los Angeles. He has authored and edited more than a dozen books and two dozen articles covering arms control, diplomatic history, international law, and American foreign policy. Most recently, he co-authored The Quest for Missile Defense, 1944-2003 (2004). His other publications include an edited three-volume, Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament (1993), a co-edited three-volume Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, Second Edition (2002), an edited three-volume Chronological History of United States Foreign Relations (2002), and Cold War Chronology, 1917-1992 (2005).

Joseph M. Siracusa is Professor of International Diplomacy and Director of Global Studies in the School of Global Studies, Social Science and Planning, at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology where he is a specialist in nuclear politics and global security. A native of Chicago and long-time resident of Australia, he is internationally known for his writings on nuclear history, diplomacy, and presidential politics. He is also a frequent political affairs commentator in the Australian media, including ABC Radio National. His books include A History of United States Foreign Policy, Depression to Cold War: A History of America from Herbert Hoover to Ronald Reagan (with David G. Coleman), Presidential Profiles: The Kennedy Years, and Real-World Nuclear Deterrence: The Making of International Strategy (with David G. Coleman).


The End of the Soviet Union 1991

Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk (left), Belarusian Supreme Soviet speaker Stanislav Shushkevich (center), and Russian president Boris Yeltsin after signing the Belovezhie agreement that broke up the Soviet Union, December 8, 1991. Yeltsin called Bush to let him know even before Shushkevich called Gorbachev. (Credit: RFE/RL from Tass)

President Gorbachev’s last phone call, December 25, 1991, declassified by the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library through Mandatory Review request 2004-1975-MR by the National Security Archive.

Washington, D.C., December 25, 2016 – On Christmas Day 25 years ago, the last leader of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, stepped down and the hammer-and-sickle flags over the Kremlin were replaced with the red-white-and-blue of the Russian Federation. Triumphalists and conspiracy theorists ever since have attributed this epochal event to the machinations of U.S. policy makers.

But close review of the now-declassified documents of all the conversations between American and Soviet leaders published for the first time in the new book, The Last Superpower Summits (CEU Press)[1], shows that keeping the Union together, and backing Gorbachev personally, remained at the core of U.S. policy all the way through 1991, for fear of a bloody disintegration that would dwarf the slaughter taking place at that time in Yugoslavia. “Yugoslavia with nuclear weapons,” as one official put it.

The August 1991 attempted coup by hardliners, which humiliated Gorbachev, discredited the state security organs, and made Boris Yeltsin a hero for his defiance (standing famously on top of a tank in Moscow), unleashed the centrifugal forces that brought down the Soviet Union. Gorbachev had been attempting to work out a new Union Treaty for a more decentralized system giving the various Soviet republics more autonomy – the scheduled signing date of August 20 was a key precipitator for the coup.

But when the coup failed, the republic leaders had tasted sovereignty and were concerned about an assertive Russia, whether run by Boris Yeltsin now or hardliners in the future. At the same time, each of the republic leaders was attempting to hold on to their own centers of power and not let the opposition form new governments. Eventually, almost all the Communist Party first secretaries would become leaders of new independent states. To achieve that, they had to take the banner of nationalism away from the authentic nationalist and dissident movements--a process that was especially important in Ukraine, where the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, professional Soviet apparatchik Leonid Kravchuk, maneuvered to coopt both the nationalist Rukh and the dissident opposition.[2]

President George H.W. Bush and his Secretary of State, James Baker, believed that keeping the Soviet Union going, even with a weak center, was the best alternative to violent disintegration. (The Americans did not know at the time that tactical nuclear weapons were spread about in 14 of the 15 republics, but it was bad enough that over 3,000 strategic nuclear weapons were stationed outside Russia in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus.) At a key National Security Council meeting on September 5, 1991, senior members of the administration presented their views. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney was the strongest proponent of encouraging the rapid disintegration of the USSR because he saw the fracturing of the former enemy as a diminution of threat. When he argued that “the voluntary breakup of the Soviet Union is in our interest,” Baker reminded him of bloody Yugoslavia.[3] Shockingly, national security advisor Brent Scowcroft confessed he “thought there was positive benefit in the breakup of command and control over strategic nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union to several republics. Anything which would serve to dilute the size of an attack we might have to face was, in my view, a benefit well worth the deterioration of unified control over the weapons.”[4] By comparison, President Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis worried about a single bomb landing on an American city.

President Bush saw both the opportunity and the danger. Gorbachev was not going to be around much longer to make the arms-race-in-reverse happen. So Bush insisted on pushing the envelope, and given the reality in the Soviet Union, with so many ideological blinders about Soviet behavior in tatters on the floor of the Situation Room, the NSC agreed with the president’s push to offer significant and unilateral disarmament initiatives.

Bush’s understanding that the sand was running out in the hourglass jump-started U.S. thinking, propelling it past a fistful of hard-and-fast previous positions on matters like tactical nuclear weapons on U.S. Navy ships. Never in the U.S national security interest (with far more coastline to protect than the USSR), the Navy’s sticking point came apart quickly when the president ordered immediate moves toward denuclearization--ironically, based on a proposal Gorbachev had first tabled at the Malta summit in 1989. Bush’s urgent post-coup search for deep disarmament initiatives led to a dramatic package of proposals and unilateral moves, which he presented to Gorbachev on September 27 in hopes that Moscow would reciprocate. The Soviets responded with their own counterproposals on October 5. Both sets of initiatives were truly groundbreaking but they came too late in the game, after Gorbachev was already unable to push them through to full implementation. Yet, without this back-and-forth, hundreds if not thousands of nuclear warheads would have been in place in more than a dozen Soviet republics at the point of the Soviet Union’s demise. In the history of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’ Doomsday Clock, spanning virtually the entire atomic age, this set of agreements in the fall of 1991 produced the biggest shift away from midnight.

These proposals gave Gorbachev an opening to invigorate his “autumn offensive,”[5] on which he had embarked in early September, both in domestic politics and internationally. Yeltsin might have had the popular imagination, the podium in the Russian Supreme Soviet, the ability to undermine Gorbachev in the republics, and the initiative for political change but Gorbachev retained a special camaraderie with international leaders, and the status of official representative of whatever Soviet federation survived--something Yeltsin could only envy. That was Gorbachev’s survival strategy.

On September 10, the Conference on the Human Dimension of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) opened in Moscow. The achievement was bittersweet. It was Gorbachev’s dream to have a CSCE meeting in the Soviet capital as a way to recognize how the country had changed--in fact, Shevardnadze had proposed it in November 1986, in his speech to the opening session of the CSCE Vienna review conference. At the time it was met with a skeptical and even negative reaction from Western delegates, given the history of Soviet human rights violations. After a lot of work by the Foreign Ministry together with its U.S. counterparts and an unprecedented domestic opening, the West was finally persuaded. Gorbachev was enthusiastic he addressed a hall filled with foreign ministers and ambassadors who had come to Moscow mainly to pay respects to the man responsible for the tremendous change that made the gathering possible.

Gorbachev probably was the only person at the meeting who still believed in the possibility of integrating the Soviet Union into Europe. In the perceptive words of his spokesman, Andrei Grachev, “he was inspired by an almost religious faith in the feasibility of finally joining these two separate worlds and a burning desire to bring this about.”[6] The humanitarian conference was in some ways the crowning symbol and the final note of Gorbachev’s domestic reform. Several dissident groups took part in the sessions and international NGOs were welcome participants with unobstructed access to anybody they wished to contact.

Visiting Secretary of State Baker found Gorbachev revitalized by the experience: “the shaken Gorbachev of late August was gone, replaced by his former self--the Soviet reformer with little if any self-doubt.”[7] Baker also wrote to Bush about the newfound closeness and cooperation between Yeltsin and Gorbachev--although it was not to last.

With Yeltsin on vacation later in September, Gorbachev was able to play the role of global statesman and gracious host. He resumed his flurry of international meetings. He met with Giulio Andreotti and Hosni Mubarak to discuss the Middle East and the upcoming Madrid conference. On October 1, he met with Henning Christopherson, the vice president of the European Commission, and soon after that with Michael Camdessus, director of the International Monetary Fund, to discuss the economic structures of the new Union Treaty and international assistance. U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Edward Madigan came to discuss the agricultural credits Bush had promised at the Moscow summit. Negotiations with British prime minister John Major about a program of emergency aid were especially active, resulting in a preliminary pledge of 10 billion dollars on November 14. Gorbachev understood that ensuring external aid was the strongest means of keeping his new Union project on track.[8]

But the August coup had resulted in significant changes in the political landscape. The Congress of People’s Deputies disbanded itself in early September 1991, leaving in place a quite dysfunctional Supreme Soviet at the Union level. Legislative initiative had shifted to the Russian parliament, still named the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, and presided over by Yeltsin. The KGB was eliminated, broken into three agencies, thus also weakening ties that bound the republics together. A new structure was created--the State Council consisting of leaders of the republics—designed to negotiate a new union treaty and oversee the process of transition. It held its first meeting on October 11. Grachev described it as an “awkward imitation of the U.N. Security Council composed of former members of the Politburo.”[9] However, Gorbachev put his faith and hopes in this Council. Very soon it produced a vague Economic Community Agreement, signed on October 18 (Ukraine signed on November 6). The accord included a commitment to a single currency and the preservation of economic ties. Yeltsin supported it and acted cooperatively. Meanwhile, negotiations for a political agreement were proceeding. For a fleeting moment in mid-October, it seemed that Gorbachev’s project was on the right track, providing a promising setting for the Madrid conference on the Middle East.

Bush and Gorbachev arrived in Madrid on October 28, 1991, ready to preside together over the opening of this very ambitious conference, which grew directly out of their understandings reached during the Helsinki summit in September 1990. During Helsinki, Gorbachev had asked to link his support for U.S. decisions on Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait with a comprehensive international conference on the Middle East. Bush refused the explicit linkage but promised that after the Persian Gulf conflict the superpowers would co-sponsor a meeting on the region. After months of diplomatic efforts, most importantly by Secretary Baker, but also by Soviet diplomats, the main Middle East actors were about to meet in Madrid. Moscow granted diplomatic recognition to Israel just days beforehand. The mere fact that U.S. and Soviet leaders would open the event together was an important symbol of the end of the Cold War.

Gorbachev wanted Madrid to serve as a forum where the two presidents would discuss the fate of the world on the eve of the conference and cement their cooperation as the key global security dynamic. He was also hoping to get to talk to Bush privately about his need for urgent financial assistance for his reform program--to keep the USSR from disintegrating and to show Yeltsin who still had the ear of global leaders. For his part, however, Bush was expecting to see a president without a country, almost anticipating losing Gorbachev as a partner in his diary: “Reports recently that he might not be around long. The briefing book indicates this may be my last meeting with him of this nature. Time marches on.”[10] The scene-setter memo for the summit declared succinctly, “Prospects for a political union, and therefore a long-term role for Gorbachev as union president, seem nil.”[11] The briefing book’s prediction turned out to be on target.

As Gorbachev rode to the airport on the way to Madrid, Yeltsin addressed the Russian parliament with an explosive speech. (Gorbachev spoke with Yeltsin about it ahead of time but the latter did not reveal the full content.) The address asked the Russian Supreme Soviet for emergency powers to implement radical economic reform, including speedy price liberalization. This unilateral program, not discussed or coordinated with other republican leaders, essentially undermined previous economic agreements, and decisively chose the “go it alone” path for Russia, including dramatic cuts in funding for most central structures. (The Foreign Ministry would be cut by 90 percent.) From the Soviet transcript of the Bush and Gorbachev one-on-one meeting in Madrid, we know that the U.S. side had information about the content of the upcoming speech and contacted the Russian leadership with requests to tone it down, but the attempt was in vain.[12]

Gorbachev believed at the time that Yeltsin was under the influence of his close advisers, and that this explained his frequent turnabouts. Gorbachev’s memoir dates the turning point in Yeltsin’s evolution to a particular moment in September 1991, when Yeltsin’s secretary of state, “the evil genius” Gennady Burbulis, brought to his boss in Sochi a secret memorandum entitled “Strategy for Russia in the Transition Period.”[13] Drafted by Burbulis, it called for the speedy formation of a Russian state that would be the sole legal heir to the Soviet Union and would embark on a radical economic reform alone, leaving behind the center and the rest of the republics. This was the strategy--to get rid of Gorbachev by dismantling the Union.

Gorbachev’s interlocutors in Madrid, including King Juan Carlos, expressed their sincere outrage at Yeltsin’s speech and their support for Gorbachev. Bush spoke very frankly: “I hope you know the position of our government: we support the center. Without giving up contacts with the republics, we support the center and you personally.” He even mentioned that his speech in Kiev had cost him politically--on the eve of an election year he was seen as clinging to Gorbachev rather than throwing his support behind the “democratic forces” led by Yeltsin.[14] All conversations involved detailed discussions of the new Union Treaty. Gorbachev insisted on a single country with unified armed forces and a popularly elected president, a unified power grid, a transportation network, communications, space exploration, and a single economic space. At different times Gorbachev agreed with Bush that Yeltsin was trying to substitute Russia for the center in the new structure but then also said that Yeltsin understood the need for the center and realized that Russian economic reform was impossible without it.

The high point of the summit was the state dinner hosted by King Juan Carlos along with Prime Minister Gonzalez, the foreign leader Gorbachev felt was closest to him in his thinking and ideas. The four-hour conversation ranged from Soviet domestic to international subjects and allowed Gorbachev to play the role of global statesman once again. Yeltsin’s speech was one of the first subjects. Bush was concerned by Yeltsin’s statements about the borders and Russian minorities in the republics, especially in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Gorbachev noted the volatility of the Ukrainian situation: “Ukraine in its present form emerged only because the Bolsheviks did not have a majority in the Rada, and they added Kharkov and Donbass to the Ukraine. And Khrushchev passed Crimea from Russia to the Ukraine in a brotherly gesture.” Crimea, he said, decided to stay with Ukraine only on the assumption that Ukraine would be inseparable from Russia, which might change if Ukraine decided not to join the Union.[15] Gorbachev made a passionate statement about his determination to see his country hold together, and although all the principals were outspoken in their sympathy for his predicament, they also understood that his chances were slim. Madrid turned out to be the last superpower summit.

Upon arriving home, Gorbachev found his new Union project disintegrating even further. He was able to stanch the process by applying pressure on Yeltsin and threatening resignation, but that would not work for long. On December 1, Ukraine held a referendum in which 70 percent of the population voted for independence. Kravchuk was elected president and soon made it clear to Yeltsin that he was not going to be part of the new Union Treaty negotiations in any form, no more “big brother” Russia. On December 8, during a protracted negotiation at a hunting lodge in Belarus (and at the suggestion of Burbulis), the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus signed the Belovezhie agreement to dissolve the USSR and create a Commonwealth of Independent States. Yeltsin rushed to phone Bush to inform him, emphasizing that Gorbachev did not know yet about it.[16] Gorbachev actually heard the news after Bush did, from Belarus’s leader, Stanislav Shushkevich. The most prominent non-Slav republic leader, Nursultan Nazarbayev, had declined to join the Belovezhie crew, demanding instead a meeting in Almaty, Kazakhstan, to work out the details of a successor federation.


BUSH AND YELTSIN DECLARE FORMAL END TO COLD WAR AGREE TO EXCHANGE VISITS

President Bush and President Boris N. Yeltsin of Russia today proclaimed a new era of "friendship and partnership" as they declared a formal end to seven decades of rivalry, then agreed to exchange visits in Moscow and Washington by year's end.

Meeting in casual winter clothes under snowy skies at the Presidential retreat at Camp David, Md., the two leaders reviewed the prospects for further support for Mr. Yeltsin's program of reforms and for arms control proposals that could reduce the number of nuclear warheads that each nation deploys to as few as 2,500.

But they indicated at a news conference after their three-and-a-half-hour meeting that no agreements had been reached on either issue, and that the matters would be taken up this winter. Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d will visit Moscow this month to establish the basis for further arms talks, Mr. Bush said. Restatement of Principles

The centerpiece of the meeting was a declaration signed by the two men that outlined general principles for relations between the United States and Russia. The declaration was largely a restatement of cooperative policies established between Washington and Moscow before the Soviet Union collapsed and Mikhail S. Gorbachev resigned as Soviet President at the end of December. [ The text of the declaration and excerpts from the news conference appear on page 8. ]

But by endorsing and signing the statement today, Mr. Bush lent prestige to Mr. Yeltsin as the leader of Russia, giving him a boost of the sort Mr. Gorbachev often gained in his trips abroad.

"Russia and the United States do not regard each other as potential adversaries," the declaration says. "From now on, the relationship will be characterized by friendship and partnership founded on mutual trust and respect and a common commitment to democracy and economic freedom." Many Advisers on Both Sides

The two leaders were accompanied to Camp David by senior aides, including a roster of advisers to Mr. Yeltsin who are largely unknown to most Americans. They included the Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev Marshal Yevgeny I. Shaposhnikov, who commands the combined military of the Commonwealth of Independent States Yuli M. Vorontsov, chief Russian delegate to the United Nations Yevgeny P. Velikhov, deputy chairman of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and Vladimir P. Lukin, the Ambassador-designate to Washington.

With Mr. Bush were Mr. Baker Defense Secretary Dick Cheney Treasury Secretary Nicholas F. Brady Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser Robert S. Strauss, the American Ambassador to Russia, and Dennis Ross, the director of the policy planning office at the State Department and Mr. Baker's senior adviser on Russia.

The only new issue of substance to emerge from the session appeared to be an offer by Mr. Bush to set up a joint center in which American scientists would pursue research with some of the 2,000 or more Russian nuclear experts who are being displaced by Mr. Yeltsin's sharp military cutbacks.

Mr. Yeltsin said he enthusiastically supported the proposal, which is aimed at preventing the scientists from selling their services to terrorists or other nations seeking to develop a nuclear arsenal. Russia has already begun offering raises and other benefits to the scientists to keep them from leaving, he said.

At the news conference, the two leaders warmly praised each other's leadership.

The American President said he has "a very warm feeling in my heart about what he has done and is trying to do, and I consider him my friend." In return, he received effusive praise from his guest. 'Tremendously Impressed'

"I consider I would be very lucky in life, both as a political person and just as a man, to have met George Bush," Mr. Yeltsin said. "I'm just tremendously impressed by his wisdom. I think he has incredible qualities not only as a political person but also as a person, as a really great political figure of the United States."

Later, perhaps with a measure of pride, he said: "We call each other on the telephone. We say Boris and say George. And already this says a lot."

Translating affability into substance, the two leaders said the enmity that had separated their countries over most of seven decades was ended.

As Mr. Yeltsin put it: "Today one might say that there has been written and drawn a new line, and crossed out all of the things that have been associated with the cold war.

"From now on we do not consider ourselves to be potential enemies, as it had been previously in our military doctrine. This is the historic value of this meeting. And another very important factor in our relationship, right away today, it's already been pointed out that in the future there'll be full frankness, full openness, full honesty in our relationship."

Mr. Bush said: "Russia and the United States are charting a new relationship, and it's based on trust it's based on a commitment to economic and political freedom it's based on a strong hope for true partnership."

Yet for Mr. Bush, the embrace sometimes remained at arm's length, especially when nuclear weapons came up.

Mr. Yeltsin discussed the possibility of cutting strategic and tactical nuclear warheads to 2,500 for each nation. That figure, which Mr. Yelstin proposed earlier this week, is roughly half the number that Mr. Bush suggested retaining in a proposal he made in his State of the Union address on Tuesday.

Mr. Bush said he had agreed only that further cuts in nuclear weapons would be taken up when Mr. Baker goes back to Moscow. "We didn't go into any agreements on categories or numbers, but we decided that we would let the experts talk about this in much more detail," Mr. Bush said. "But we saluted his very broad proposals."

He also refused to say whether the United States had reciprocated Mr. Yeltsin's decision, made public last week, to cease aiming nuclear missiles and bombers at American targets.

"We agreed all these matters will be discussed in Moscow," he said.

Similarly, Mr. Yeltsin said he and Mr. Bush had discussed developing a global space-based defense against nuclear missiles "on a mutual basis," perhaps in conjunction with other nuclear nations. But Mr. Bush said only that they had reached no decision and that their aides would take it up later.

Although President Ronald Reagan began research on a defense against incoming missiles with a pledge to share the technology with the Soviet Union, Mr. Bush has so far ruled out any transfer of missile-defense secrets.

Although he made no specific pledges, Mr. Bush was more positive in his support for Mr. Yeltsin's political and economic reforms, saying he was "totally convinced" of Russia's commitment to democracy and hoped to assist "in any way possible." Money, and More . . .

Mr. Yeltsin said that his country needed far more than money if it was to make the transition to democracy, and that the cost of failure would be great.

"I didn't come here just to stretch out my hand and ask for help," the Russian President said. "No, we're calling for cooperation, cooperation for the whole world, because if the reform in Russia goes under, that means there will be a cold war. The cold war is going to turn into a hot war. This is, again, going to be an arms race."

Back in Washington after the Camp David meeting, Mr. Yeltsin met for an hour and 10 minutes with Congressional leaders, and the lawmakers said the conversation focused on economic reform and the assistance that Russia and the other former Soviet republics need. Representative Richard A. Gephardt, Democrat of Missouri, the House majority leader, said Mr. Yeltsin "delivered a loud, clear message that if there's going to be help, it needs to come now."

Senator Bob Dole, Republican of Kansas, the minority leader, said of Mr. Yeltsin: "He may be the last hope. That's the message he gave us. This may be the last chance."

While he was in Washington, Mr. Yeltsin also presented a medal to Mstislav Rostropovich, the Russian emigre cellist and conductor, who suggested that he would perform more and more in his homeland in the years ahead and live part of the time there.

Mr. Rostropovich left the Soviet Union after being barred from performing, and became conductor of the National Symphony here, vowing not to return while his homeland remained under Communism. He did return when Communism collapsed, and was on a visit to Moscow during the unsuccessful coup against Mr. Gorbachev last summer where he joined Mr. Yeltsin's supporters in defending the Russian Parliament.

Mr. Yeltsin left Washington about 4:40 P.M. to fly to Ottawa for a meeting with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. -------------------- Yeltsin and Mulroney Meet

OTTAWA, Feb. 1 (Special to The New York Times) -- President Yeltsin made the final stop of his three-day visit to North America in the Canadian capital today for talks with Canada's Prime Minister.

On arrival from Washington, Mr. Yeltsin broke away from Mr. Mulroney and other Canadian officials to talk briefly with spectators who had gathered at the airport to greet him in the sub-zero weather. "We're not here to quarrel, we're here to do business," Mr. Yeltsin said. "We come not as enemies, but as allies."


Watch the video: ΕΡΤΕΤ-2 ΔΕΛΤΙΟ ΕΙΔΗΣΕΩΝ 25121991: Κατάρρευση σκυτάλης από Γκορμπατσώφ σε Γέλτσιν (January 2022).