Information

4 April 1941


4 April 1941

April 1941

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North Africa

Germans capture Benghazi and Msus

East Africa

Italians evacuate (Ethiopia)

Diplomacy

Matsuoka meets Hitler



Catalogue description Vol. II. 4 April 1941 - 5 Jan. 1942.

When the second volume of the diary opens on 4 April 1941 Quinn is serving in Belfast with BTNI. In the entry for 9 April he tells how he receives orders to proceed on Embarkation Leave, and a few days later he goes to London. He spends a month there, and gives certain details of the Home Front at a critical stage of the war:-

. We talked about morale. He was happy about it in Peckham. I did see slogans WE WANT CHEESE NOT CHURCHILL (and) RATION THE RICH. And PPU posters WOMEN, ENROL FOR PEACE NOT WAR (and) DICK SHEPHERD'S WORK GOES ON. But I don't think either out much ice.

On the night of 11-12 May he goes out to fight fires caused by enemy air raids in Dorset Square:-

I felt it a good thing that I wore my clerical collar. I think people liked to see that the clergy were in this too and not in a shelter.

He notes the contrast of peace in the midst of war -

. I walked up Hyde Park to Marble Arch. It seemed just like a Saturday in Peace with couples on seats, a band playing, and at Marble Arch the usual selection of orators, maintaining with no little heat their various opinions.

On 19 May he goes aboard the Georgic and sails for the Middle East. At the beginning of the voyage he records this self-revelation:

I have a struggle to keep myself from wanting to be the important person among the chaplains. I must learn to be content in whatever state I am, and that Christ said that whosoever would be greatest among his disciples should be the least. The Naval Chaplain has been put in charge by O.C. Troops. It's a small petty thing, but one that can cause a lot of heartburning. I must conquer it.

He disembarks at Port Tewfik on 8 July and goes to Abbassia. His first month in Egypt has been transcribed in full and is attached to the diary.

On 10 August he moves to Tobruk, and from the first finds it enjoyable

I like Tobruk. It's delightfully cool - a breeze all day and at night chilly. The place itself is largely in ruins and there are hardly any troops there but in the arc of 36 miles that we defend.

His comments on the morale of some of the troops are of interest:-

The morale of the Tanks is not too good. you find the men rather unhelpful and lacking in discipline e.g. never saluting and talking to you with their hands in their pockets.

The British ability to carry military stores 10,000 miles or more and then waste a great part of them is shown in his entry for Sunday 16 November:-

. 3 destroyers in tonight. Went out on 'Fair Maid' to 'Kipling' with wounded. It was very choppy and a bit of a job getting the chaps off the lighter on to the ship. Then we spent a long time loading the lighter with sacks of tinned food and stuff. About 20% went into the sea and was lost, also a few kits. It was most interesting.

When the attempt is made to relieve the siege of Tobruk towards the end of November 1941, Quinn goes forward to help the wounded. Rather foolishly he gets himself into a position in which he can help no-one and becomes something of a liability:-

. Finding a Bren carrier going forward to bring back another damaged Carrier, I got a lift forward. But I got a bit alarmed how far forward we were going, far further than I should ever have wished. First we passed the I tanks, which had stopped, then we passed through the Infantry advancing with fixed bayonets through a tornado of enemy shelling.

Suddenly there was a terrific explosion and we were enveloped in a cloud of smoke, and we were half-blown, half-scrambled out of the carrier and fell on the ground. I was surprised to find that I was still alive and later that all my limbs were all complete apart from a pain on the knee, but no serious harm.

After a little (time) the RNF's helped me to a slit trench where I spent half an hour contemplating my escape and wondering how long the shelling would go on missing me. My chief loss was my glasses which had vanished. However I could see enough to see when I looked into the Carrier that the Driver was sprawling there dead. His companion likewise.

When I felt a bit better and when I saw a section of RNF putting their guns round my trench, I felt the time had come to move. So I hobbled off and joining up with a Y. and L. NCO we made good progress and reached Lion. Here I got some tea, had my knee treated, and had a good chat with the M.O., an extremely nice chap. He lent me a driver to take me back to Breed, from whom I had got separated.

He stays in Tobruk for Christmas and then gets 10 days' leave in Cairo, and there the second volume ends.


Fascism in Croatia

The Independent State of Croatia was founded on 10 April 1941.

Croatian history is complicated. The Croats were Slavs from the area of modern Poland who settled in the Balkans, in the Byzantine Empire, at some date in the sixth century or later. They were converted to Christianity, but unlike their Eastern Orthodox neighbours, the Serbs, the Croats were Roman Catholics. There was a Croatian kingdom in the 10th century, which was later dominated by Hungary. In the 16th and 17th centuries much of Croatia was part of the Ottoman Empire, which was Muslim, and areas of Croatia were later part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

After the First World War, the Treaty of Versailles set up an independent state which included Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. It was dominated by the Serbs, who in 1929 named it Yugoslavia. By this time Croatian nationalism had become a significant force and a Croat called Ante Pavelic moved to Fascist Italy, where he founded a nationalist organisation called the Ustasha-Croatian Revolutionary Movement. He had the backing of Mussolini and he won support from Croat exiles in Italy as well as in Croatia itself.

With the Second World War at full tilt, in 1941 the Axis alliance of Germany and Italy invaded Yugoslavia on April 6th. That gave the nationalists the opportunity they had long hoped for and four days later an Ustasha leader called Slavko Kvaternik, a former general in the Yugoslav army, seized control of Zagreb, the Croatian capital, and went on the radio to announce the creation of the Independent State of Croatia. He paved the way for Ante Pavelic to return to Zagreb from Italy with hundreds of other supporters and on April 16th Pavelic declared himself the leader of the new Croatian regime as Poglavnik, or dictator. He appointed Kvaternik as his deputy and other Ustase figures as ministers.

This was gladly accepted by the Axis powers, which treated Croatia as a puppet state. The new Croatia included today’s Bosnia and Herzegovina and also parts of Serbia. The Ustasha rejected the idea that Croats were Slavs and maintained that they were descended from Germanic Goths and were consequently Aryans. They were aggressively Roman Catholic, but they accepted Islam as the other historic faith of Croatian national identity. Sharing Nazi Germany’s ideals and predilections, they wanted a Croatia that was racially pure and they embarked on an extermination programme that in four years would claim hundreds of thousands of victims.

Pavelic banned the Cyrillic alphabet, in which the rituals of the Serbian Orthodox church were written, and started to persecute Jews. In May he went to Rome to see Pope Pius II in the hope of winning Vatican approval, but failed, though the Vatican did send an ambassdor to Zagreb. One of the Ustasha ministers declared: ‘This country can only be a Croatian country and there is no method we would hesitate to use in order to make it truly Croatian and cleanse it of Serbs, who have for centuries endangered us and will endanger us again if given the opportunity.’ In June Pavelic went to Germany to see Hitler, who recommended expelling all Jews from Croatia. In the following month work started on Croatia’s first concentration camps, on the German model.

Pavelic sent some Jews to Auschwitz, but more were sent to the Croatian camps, along with Serbs, gypsies and Croatian and Bosnian opponents of the regime. The most notorious camp was Jasenovac, which opened in 1941 in an area occupied by the German army. The vast majority sent there were Serbs. Some prisoners were lucky enough to be shot dead or killed quickly with a knife, but others died agonisingly in boiling tubs of water, were battered to death with a club or had their heads cut off with a blunt saw.

The German defeat in 1945 put an end to the Ustasha regime. Communist partisans entered Zagreb in May, completing their reconquest of Yugoslavia, and some of the Ustasha leaders were captured. Among them was Slavko Kvaternik, who was executed in Zagreb in 1947. Other Ustasha members hid as inconspicuously as they could in Croatia while some fled to Latin America or even Canada and Australia. Pavelic himself managed to hide in Austria and then in Rome before escaping to Argentina. He was shot and mortally wounded by a Montenegrin near Buenos Aires in 1957.

Long before that, Croatia had been incorporated into the communist republic of Yugoslavia, led by Marshal Tito as prime minister and later president until his death in 1980. The Croats continued to demand greater autonomy and a new independent government announced Croatia’s independence once again in 1991.


The Other Day of Infamy in 1941

On April 13, 1941, Japan’s foreign minister, Yosuke Matsuoka, and the Soviet commissar of foreign affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov, signed a neutrality pact, valid for five years. Although less notorious than the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between the Soviets and the Nazis, which plunged Europe into war, the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact had similar consequences in Asia.

As the London News Chronicle observed in reporting on the agreement: “What better guarantee [for Stalin] against Japanese hostility than that Japan turn south and cross swords with the United States? Moscow will feel secure in the Far East only when the Japanese and American navies engage.” Matsuoka and Stalin vowed Japan and the U.S.S.R. would “annihilate Anglo-Saxon ideology” and build a “new world order.” Matsuoka, a nationalist surprised to have signed a treaty with Japan’s Communist archenemy, later called Stalin’s neutrality pact an “act of diplomatic blitzkrieg.”

For years, there had been a tug-of-war in Tokyo between army and navy over strategy. The army’s “strike north” scheme envisioned a rapid conquest of Siberia to eliminate the Communist threat. Japan’s admirals, by contrast, war-gamed seizing resource-rich U.S. and European territories in Southeast Asia, in case Japan was ever cut off from American resources—especially oil—in retaliation for its 1937 invasion of China.

While many historians view the attack on Pearl Harbor as the inevitable outgrowth of U.S.-Japanese tensions, until April 1941 Japan’s factions remained in delicate balance, as did its relations with the Soviet Union, Britain and the U.S. Matsuoka’s brief on his European trip was to ascertain Hitler’s intentions: Would he invade Britain across the English Channel, or turn east and attack Soviet Russia?

Had Hitler told Matsuoka the truth and asked for help, it is likely that Japan would have attacked Siberia in coordination with Germany’s Operation Barbarossa, sparing Pearl Harbor. By refusing to trust Matsuoka but letting Ribbentrop drop hints about his plans, Hitler gave Matsuoka motivation to betray him by agreeing to a deal with Stalin, almost out of spite. Matsuoka was drinking heavily with Stalin when he signed the neutrality pact and was still sozzled when Stalin saw him off at the Moscow train station: Witnesses noted that Matsuoka “laughed with glee.”


Today in World War II History—April 3, 1941

Foreign Ministers Aleksandar Cincar-Marković of Yugoslavia and László Bárdossy of Hungary signing the Treaty of Eternal Friendship between Yugoslavia and Hungary Hungarian Prime Minister Pál Teleki (with glasses) is on the left, Budapest, 14 March 1941 (public domain via Wikipedia)

80 Years Ago—Apr. 3, 1941: Hungarian Prime Minister Pál Teleki commits suicide because of his government’s decision to allow German troops to cross Hungarian territory and invade Yugoslavia, violating their treaty of friendship.

In Iraq, former prime minister Rashid Ali al-Gaylani overthrows Regent Abdul Illah and forms a pro-Axis government.


You were born on a Saturday

April 12, 1941 was the 15th Saturday of that year. It was also the 102nd day and 4th month of 1941 in the Georgian calendar. The next time you can reuse 1941 calendar will be in 2025. Both calendars will be exactly the same.

There are left before your next birthday. Your 81st birthday will be on a Sunday and a birthday after that will be on a Wednesday. The timer below is a countdown clock to your next birthday. It’s always accurate and is automatically updated.

Your next birthday is on a Sunday


Re: RASC on the run March - April 1941

Post by Urmel » 14 Sep 2015, 00:24

The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

Re: RASC on the run March - April 1941

Post by ClintHardware » 20 Sep 2015, 14:59

Mark
I have given you the data from Joslen and you have given a response without references. Its always no references with you isn't it.

2nd Support Group arrived as a full Sp Gp in Egypt and expected to go into action with both Motor Battalions and the other supporting units I have previously listed - instead it went into action with less than half of the complement of such units because of Greece and the need to provide the 1st Armd Bde with the other half and LAA for the Canal which was in danger of being mined.

However you try to dance about with your mischievous statements that lack references - you have failed. The other evidence remains the fact that 2nd Armd Division deployed only 3rd Armd Bde instead of 1st and 3rd Armd Bdes and that the missing units (other than the 15th LAA) were with 1st Armd Bde and in W Force.

Everybody. can we please keep making a point of asking Mark for references. I see some of you have joined in doing this - well keep going.

Also in respect of the original point of this Topic which was information to support RASC collapse mythology - has anyone found any actual evidence of sustained logistical collapse? None of you have posted any as yet. There were incidents of stuff being required and not present causing Italian tanks lost through lack of diesel, but what of the major myth of RASC collapse? What CYRCOM units had to be abandoned in the desert - I haven't found any.

Somewhile ago Mark sneered without references on another topic at the very idea of the RASC providing ad-hoc dumping but he hasn't given anything to counter any of the documents I have given that have included statements of to ad-hoc dumping (eg the 25,000 gallons at Ghemines to save the arse of the Aussies after the Magrun episode 2nd April).

And. Everybody. can we please keep making a point of asking Mark for references. I see some of you have joined in doing this - well keep going.

Re: RASC on the run March - April 1941

Post by MarkN » 20 Sep 2015, 15:33

It would help your cause if you read the correct pages of Joslen. In other words, look up the organisation of the armoured division and the support group relevant to the dates being discussed instead of repeatedly quoting out dated organisations.

In March/April 1941, the establishment of a support group was for a single lorried infantry battalion. 2 Support Group on 31 March 1941 had a motor infantry battalion and two additional infantry companies under command.

PS. Please show me where I have "sneered . at the very idea of the RASC providing ad-hoc dumping". It seems to me, once again, you're making up things.

Re: RASC on the run March - April 1941

Post by Urmel » 20 Sep 2015, 18:54

The blowing of the dump at Msus let to the armoured brigade running out of petrol, according to e.g. the Indian OH. This implicitly allows us to conclude that the RASC was not able to make up for the lack of supply caused by the blowing up of the dump.

As for your call for referencing - pot calling kettle black. Sorry, but your credibility is fairly shot on this account. You still have not provided any evidence other than your personal opinion for your claim that the Germans made up their claims.

This whole discussion would be massively improved if you either did that, or acknowledged you were talking rubbish.

The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

Re: RASC on the run March - April 1941

Post by ClintHardware » 21 Sep 2015, 07:19

To deal with Urmel's points
Msus was maintained until under threat and then ad-hoc supply met the 3rd Armd Bde en-route as is explained by the unit war diaries. One of those supply efforts was destroyed by air attack but nevertheless shows ad-hoc supply in operation.

Blowing the dump was undertaken using logic as explained by Lieutenant Hore-Ruthven of the 1st THR who talked through the matter with Major Mitford of the LRDG. Thereafter supply continued ad-hoc en route.

My opinion is that Rommel allowed exaggeration in claims so that he could pacify Halder and that opinion is based on the miss-match between German claims and actual losses and subsequent events. However, that is only my opinion based on British War Diaries and eye witnesses. There would have been at best 33 Carriers present at Mersa Brega on the 31st because D Company was back a Agedabia so why claim 55? And their battalion total was not more than 44 to start with.

If I have given anything without a reference let me know and I will supply it. Be specific please.

To deal with Mark's points
If you look at 7th Support Group in Joslen and then compare it to the units that 2nd Support Group left the UK with, and arrived with, in Egypt you will see the disparity and how the 2nd Support Group was halved for the sake of Greece. The units under command of 2nd Support Group at the point of contact were less than half in respect of all arms except field artillery which was down to 16 guns at the point of contact. The overall presence in contact is half or less of what arrived in Egypt.

Middle East formations often differed from UK on paper formations and actual UK formations, and one of those differences was the number of guns with, and organisation of, field artillery regiments in the Middle East. Just because the War Office in the UK decrees a formation from a certain date it does not mean that is what is in the field in the Middle East suddenly adopts that decree. This miss-match and delay situation is present all of the time in the Middle East.

Also let us imagine the practical comfort your statement about a War Office decree would have been to Brigadier Latham as he prepared to face two Axis armoured formations that were unknown in strength or armament with his remaining half of a Support Group - how comforting that would have been for him. Can you imagine what he would have said to any officer attempting to explain to him such paper based irrelevant blx?

You seem to want to criticise the senior officers as a form of entertainment for yourself but all the war diaries show officers making reasoned decisions and judgements based on resources and what information they had. Lieutenant Hore-Ruthven (not a senior but a good example for the moment) was promoted to Captain after the Msus situation and I am sure that did not happen because he was stupid or because he destroyed a key dump for no good reason. If he had, then he would have been under charge and would not have remained as an officer in his battalion or even the Rifle Brigade. He was able to explain each step of his reasoning in a statement not given to Churchill according to your evidence.

If I have been too savage with you about references it is because you make a point of not giving references and I suspect that you do that to amuse yourself.

If I could find Field information that confirms your line of thought then I would agree with you. Your statements always seem to be without Field context and in that respect I also mean with the context of being in contact with the enemy.

Re: RASC on the run March - April 1941

Post by MarkN » 21 Sep 2015, 10:34

What has the configuration of 7th Support Group got to do with this? You have a very creative mind when it comes to 'proving' your fictional narratives.

I am not the slightest bit interested in trying to change your mind. It is abundantly clear that you are not willing to accept your false narrative is invalid - and any attempt to prove so is futile. I post to challenge your falsehoods so that other readers do not get mislead.

Joslen, which you name as your source, clearly identifes an organisational change to the armoured division and the support group in October 1940. That change provided the support group with a single lorried infantry battalion. Those without access to Joslen can download Nafziger's reworking of the data free from the internet. Alternatively, numerous books contain references to this organisational change.

They were not less than half. They were not "less than half in respect of" either .
A) . what they arrived in the Middle East with, or
B) . the accepted establishment for a support group at that time, or
C) . the configuration of 7th Support Group at that time.
The were only "less than half in respect of" the imaginary size and configuration that you have in your head.

Moreover, field artillery was NOT " down to 16 guns at the point of contact". Again, you are writing falsehoods to support your false narrative.

1) The establishment of an RHA field artillery regiment, valid for the time period we are discussing, was 16 guns .
2) 2RHA , the RHA field artillery regiment that sailed with 2 Support Group from the UK, held 16 guns .
3) 104RHA , the RHA field artillery regiment that was under command 2 Support Group at Mersa el Brega, held 16 guns .

These are established historical facts.

You are the one claiming differently ("down to"), so where is your evidence to support your claim.

Where is the evidence to support your claims of 2 Spt Gp being "less than half" of anything? Your trivia is not evidence. Can you post up what Joslen wrote was the proscribed establishment of a support group circa March/April 1941 to evidence your claim.


4 April 1941 - History

SHOP FOR 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION APPAREL & GIFTS:

"The Ivy Division"

(Updated 9-3-08)

The 4th Infantry Division, whose motto is "Steadfast and Loyal," is a heavy mechanized division in the United States Regular Army. The 4th ID has a storied history from WWI, WWII, Vietnam, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Arguably the most modernized division in the army, the 4ID is currently organized with four Brigade Combat Teams (BCT), a fires brigade, an aviation brigade, and various supporting units. Currently home based at Fort Hood, Texas, the "Ivy Division" is in the process of re-stationing to Fort Carson, Colorado, around unit deployments to Iraq.

The 4th Infantry Division is nicknamed the "Ivy Division." This comes from the design of the shoulder sleeve insignia which has four green ivy leaves joined at the stem and opening at the four corners. The word "Ivy" is a play on the Roman numeral four, IV. Ivy leaves are symbolic of tenacity and fidelity, the basis of the Division's motto, "Steadfast and Loyal." The Division's second nickname, "Iron Horse," has been recently adopted to indicate the speed and power of the division.

The 4th Division was formed at Camp Greene, North Carolina on December 10, 1917 for service in World War One. The 4th Infantry Division went into action in the Aisne-Marne campaign in July 1918, at which time its units were piecemealed and attached to several French infantry divisions. Almost a month later, the Division was reunited for the final days of the campaign. During the next four months, the 4th I.D. saw action on the front lines and as reserves. Suffering over 11,500 casualties in the final drive for the Allied victory, the 4th Infantry Division was the only division to serve in both the French and British sectors of the front.

By the end of WWI, 2,611 Ivy Division soldiers were killed in action and 9,895 others were wounded. The 4th Division remained in Europe for occupation duty until returning to the United States on July 31, 1919. The 4th Division was inactivated at Camp Lewis, Washington on September 21, 1921.

The 4th Infantry Division was reactivated on June 1, 1940 at Fort Benning, Georgia as part of the U.S. Army buildup prior to the country's entry into World War II. From June of 1940 until late in 1943, the 4th Infantry Division served as an experimental division for the Army, testing new equipment and tactics. Finally, after years of training, the Ivy Division moved to England in January of 1944 to prepare for Operation Overlord, the D-Day landings in Normandy.

The amphibious invasion of Europe began on June 6, 1944. The Division's 8th Infantry Regiment was the first Allied ground unit to assault German forces on the Normandy Beaches. The remainder of the Division quickly followed, landing on Utah Beach. For 26 days the Division pushed inland, reaching the Port of Cherbourg and sustaining over 5,000 casualties. Breaking out of the Beachhead and expanding operations well into France, the Division was given the honor of being the first Allied unit to participate in the liberation of Paris. The Ivy Division quickly moved on through northern France reaching Belgium and the border of Germany by September 1944. In November, the 4th Infantry Division moved into the Hurtgen Forest and fought what was to be its fiercest battle. The 4th Infantry Division held its ground during the Battle of the Bulge crossed the Rhine, then the Danube, and finally ceased its advance at the Isar River in southern Germany.

When the 4th Infantry Division's WWII combat operations ended on May 2, 1945, 4,097 soldiers had been killed in action, 17,371 were wound, and 757 would later die from their wounds. The Division returned to the United States in July 1945 and was stationed at Camp Butner, North Carolina, preparing for deployment to the Pacific. However, the Japanese surrendered before the 4th ID was deployed. After the war ended the 4ID was inactivated on March 5, 1946. The Division was reactivated as a training division at Fort Ord, California on July 15, 1947.

On October 1, 1950, the 4th Infantry Division was re-designated a combat division, training at Fort Benning, Georgia. In May 1951 it deployed to Germany as the first of four U.S. divisions committed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) during the early years of the Cold War. The division headquarters was located in Frankfurt, West Germany. After a five-year tour in Germany, the division redeployed to Fort Lewis, Washington in May of 1956. The 66th Armor Regiment and 4th Signal Company of the 4th Infantry Division served in the Korean War.

The 4th Infantry Division deployed from Fort Lewis to Camp Holloway, Pleiku, Vietnam on September 25, 1966 and served more than four years, returning to Fort Carson, Colorado on December 8, 1970. Two brigades operated in the Central Highlands/II Corps Zone, but its 3rd Brigade, including the division's armor battalion, was sent to Tay Ninh Province northwest of Saigon to take part in Operation Attleboro (September to November, 1966), and later Operation Junction City (February to May, 1967), both in War Zone C.

Throughout its service in Vietnam the Ivy Division conducted combat operations in the western Central Highlands along the border between Cambodia and Vietnam. The 4th Infantry Division experienced intense combat against NVA regular forces in the mountains surrounding Kontum in the autumn of 1967. The division's 3rd Brigade was withdrawn from Vietnam in April, 1970 and deactivated at Fort Lewis. In May the remainder of the division conducted cross-border operations during the Cambodian Incursion. The Ivy Division returned from Vietnam in December and was rejoined in Fort Carson by its former 3rd Brigade from Hawaii, where it had re-deployed as part of the withdrawal of the 25th Infantry Division. One battalion remained in Vietnam as a separate organization until January, 1972. During the four and a half years of combat operations during the Vietnam War, 2,531 Ivy Division soldiers were killed in action and another 15,229 were wounded.

After Vietnam the Division settled at Fort Carson, Colorado where it reorganized as a mechanized infantry division and remained at Carson for 25 years. It was during the Division's time at Fort Carson that it had the unofficial nickname of the "Ironhorse" Division. The 4th Infantry Division moved its colors to Fort Hood, Texas in December 1995 to become the Army's first Digitized Division under the Force XXI program. In this program the Division was thoroughly involved in the training, testing, and evaluation of 72 initiatives to include the Division's Capstone Exercise (DCX I) held at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California in April, 2001 and culminating in the DCX II held at Fort Hood in October 2001.

Division elements have supported rotations to Bosnia and Kuwait as well as providing a Task Force to fight forest fires in Idaho in 2000. 4ID Soldiers supported the Winter Olympics in Utah. Since November 2001, the Division's mission was the Division Ready Brigade-prepared to deploy at a moment's notice to anywhere in the world.

The 4th Infantry Division was alerted for the Iraq War on January 19, 2003. The Division's mission was to lead an advance from Turkey into Northern Iraq. Unfortunately the Turkish government did not give their permission for U.S. Forces to use Turkey to attack Iraq, and the Ivy Division had to reroute to the war through Kuwait. Arriving after the invasion had started, the 4th Infantry Division entered Iraq as follow-on forces in April of 2003. The 4th ID was deployed in the northern area of the Sunni Triangle near Tikrit. The Ivy Division became a major part of occupation forces during the post-war period.

In Operation Red Dawn, conducted on December 2003, the Iron Horse Division in coordination with a special unit captured the top High Value Target of Iraq, Saddam Hussein. Hussein was located about 10 miles south of Tikrit, cowering in a "spider hole." His capture has been described by news media as the number one news story of 2003. The Division returned to the United States by April of 2004 with a most successful completion of their tour as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom I. Sadly, 81 Iron Horse soldiers gave their lives in OIF 1.

The 4th Infantry Division's second deployment to Iraq began in the fall of 2005. The Division headquarters replaced the 3rd Infantry Division, which had been directing security operations as the headquarters for Multi-National Division - Baghdad. The 4th ID assumed responsibility on January 7, 2006 for four provinces in central and southern Iraq: Baghdad, Karbala, An-Najaf and Babil. On January 7, 2006, MND-Baghdad also assumed responsibility for training Iraqi security forces and conducting security operations in the four provinces. The 3rd Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division was assigned to conduct security operations under the command of Task Force Band of Brothers, led initially by the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). During this deployment 229 soldiers were killed in action.

Today, the 4th Infantry Division is the most lethal, modern and deployable heavy division in the world it is prepared to conduct full-spectrum combat operations. The Iron Horse has earned twenty-one campaign streamers with sixteen 4th Infantry Division Soldiers presented the Congressional Medal of Honor. The Ivy Division began their third deployment to Iraq in late 2007 and is scheduled to return to the U.S. in 2009. The Division will continue its move to Fort Carson upon their return. The soldiers of the 4th Infantry Division continue to serve their country and live up to their unit's motto of "Steadfast and Loyal."

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HistoryLink.org

On April 10, 1941, Hooverville, the Depression-era shantytown built south of Seattle's Pioneer Square, burns down. As this town within a town became engulfed in flames, the smoke could be seen all over Seattle. After the fire, the Seattle Port Commission condemned all shacks and other abodes in the area.

The shantytown started about 1931, at the beginning of the Great Depression, by out-of-work laborers. Several times the Port of Seattle and City of Seattle attempted to get rid of the shantytown, but it wasn’t until the fire, which occurred when the Great Depression was over, that they succeeded.

Hooverville was bounded by S Charles Street and S Dearborn Street on the north, almost to S Connecticut Street (renamed Royal Brougham Way) on the south, Railroad Avenue S (renamed South Alaskan Way) on the east, and Elliott Bay on the west.

Naval officers watching shacks burn at Hooverville, Seattle, 1941


April 28, 1941: Coach, Inc. Founded, or a Tale of Premier Designer Purses!

On April 28, 1941, the company that would become Coach, Inc. maker of premium designer leather goods was founded.

Digging Deeper

The Gail Leather Company in New York City made top quality leather products by hand. In the manner of the day, most products were typically brown or black throughout the 1940’s and into the 1950’s. (Note: This researcher could not find an exact date for the founding of the company, even after corresponding with Coach. Thus, the April 28 date is arbitrary, although 1941 is correct.)

The strong and supple nature of “broken in” baseball gloves was the inspiration for processing leather that would wear well with age, getting stronger and more supple. The high quality products caught on, especially once designs started using a variety of bright colors and including various pockets and compartments. The characteristic silver toggle hearkens back to the snaps on a convertible’s roof.

Every silver lining has a cloud, and in this case the “cloud” is counterfeiting. Known as “knock-offs,” counterfeit purses and related items are the number one most counterfeited item in the United States (according to MSN.com). CNBC reports that counterfeiting is a billion dollar business!

How does the consumer protect himself/herself? The internet has dozens of websites detailing how to spot fakes and avoid getting scammed. Even YouTube has videos to tell you how to verify the genuineness of a Coach purse. Of course, Coach also makes billfolds, wallets, briefcases and a variety of other premium leather products, so buying from a reputable dealer is probably your best protection.

Although not even close to being the most expensive designer purses, Coach purses are of the highest quality and may well outlast other brands that cost more. The typical $100 to $400 price of a Coach may well be a lifetime investment. A lady I know (we can call her “Mom”) has had Coach purses for 40 years and the oldest ones are nearly like new. Only minimal cleaning and leather care is all it takes.

Coach has grown to 12,000 employees and has revenues of well over $3 billion per year. Still headquartered on West 34 th Street in New York, the company even puts their name on wristwatches and eye-wear along with all the other men’s and women’s accessories.

Question for students (and subscribers): What designer labels do you like best, and why? How about the ones you like the least? Share your opinions in the comments section below this article.

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Historical Evidence

For more information, please see Coach’s website here and to spot fake purses, see…


Watch the video: Пограничник ответный удар Сергей Безруков uTube (January 2022).